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A '''philosophical [[zombie]]''' or '''p-zombie''' is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks [[consciousness|conscious experience]], [[qualia]], or [[sentience]]. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain. While it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain), it does not actually have the experience of pain as a putative "normal" person does.
A '''philosophical [[zombie]]''' or '''p-zombie''' is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks [[consciousness|conscious experience]], [[qualia]], or [[sentience]]. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).


The notion of a philosophical zombie is mainly a [[thought experiment]] used in [[argument]]s (often called [[zombie argument]]s) in the [[philosophy of mind]], particularly arguments against forms of [[physicalism]], such as [[materialism]] and [[behaviorism]].
The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in [[thought experiment]]s intended to support [[argument]]s (often called [[zombie argument]]s) in the [[philosophy of mind]], particularly arguments against forms of [[physicalism]] such as [[materialism]], [[behaviorism]] and [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]]).


==Types of zombies==
==Types of zombie==
Philosophical zombies are widely used in thought experiments, though the detailed articulation of the concept is not always the same. There are, in effect, different types of p-zombies. What differs is how much exactly they have in common with normal human beings. P-zombies were introduced primarily to argue against specific types of physicalism, such as [[behaviorism]]. According to behaviorism, mental states exist solely in terms of behavior: belief, desire, thought, consciousness, and so on, are simply certain kinds of behavior or tendencies towards behaviors. One might invoke the notion of a p-zombie that is ''behaviorally'' indistinguishable from a normal human being, but that lacks conscious experiences. According to the behaviorist, such a being is not logically possible, since consciousness is ''defined'' in terms of behavior. So an appeal to the intuition that a p-zombie so described ''is'' possible furnishes an argument that behaviorism is false. Behaviorists tend to respond to this that a p-zombie is not possible and so the theory that one might exist is false.
Though philosophical zombies are widely used in thought experiments, the detailed articulation of the concept is not always the same. P-zombies were introduced primarily to argue against specific types of physicalism such as [[behaviorism]], according to which mental states exist solely as behavior: belief, desire, thought, consciousness, and so on, are simply certain kinds of behavior or tendencies towards behaviors. A p-zombie that is ''behaviorally'' indistinguishable from a normal human being but lacks conscious experiences is therefore not logically possible according to the behaviorist, so an appeal to the logical possibility of a p-zombie furnishes an argument that behaviorism is false. Behaviorists tend to respond that a p-zombie is not possible.


One might distinguish between various types of zombies, as they are used in different thought experiments, as follows:
The unifying idea of the zombie is of a human that has no conscious experience, but one might distinguish various types of zombie used in different thought experiments as follows;


* A ''behavioral zombie'' is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human and yet has no conscious experience.
* A ''behavioral zombie'' that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human.
* A ''neurological zombie'' has a human brain and is otherwise physically indistinguishable from a human; nevertheless, it has no conscious experience.
* A ''neurological zombie'' that has a human brain and is generallu physiologically indistinguishable from a human.
* A ''soulless zombie'' lacks a soul but is otherwise indistinguishable from a human; this concept is used to inquire to what, if anything, the [[soul]] might amount.
* A ''soulless zombie'' that lacks a soul.

However, philosophical zombies are primarily discussed in the context of arguments against physicalism (or [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]]) in general. Thus, a p-zombie is typically understood as a being that is physically indistinguishable from a normal human being but that lacks conscious experience.


==Zombie arguments==
==Zombie arguments==
{{main|Zombie argument}}
{{main|Zombie argument}}
Zombie arguments often support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are logically possible in order support some form of [[dualism]] — the view that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two kinds of property); the mental and the physical. According to [[physicalism]], physical facts determine ''all'' other facts. Since any fact other than that of consciousness may be held to be the same for a p-zombie and a normal conscious human, it follows that physicalism must hold that p-zombies are either not possible or are the same as normal humans.
{{Very long|section|date=February 2011}}


⚫
The zombie argument against physicalism is a version of a general ''modal argument'' against physicalism such as that of [[Saul Kripke]],<ref>S. Kripke, ''Naming and Necessity'' (1972)</ref> against that kind of physicalism known as [[type-identity theory]]. Further such arguments were notably advanced in the 1970s by [[Thomas Nagel]] (1970; 1974) and [[Robert Kirk]] (1974) but the general argument was most famously developed in detail by [[David Chalmers]] in ''[[The Conscious Mind]]'' (1996).
According to [[physicalism]], the physical facts determine ''all'' other facts; it follows that, since all the facts about a p-zombie are fixed by the physical facts, and these facts are the same for the p-zombie and for the normal conscious human from which it cannot be physically distinguished, physicalism must hold that p-zombies are not possible, or that p-zombies are the same as normal humans. Therefore, zombie arguments support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are possible.


According to Chalmers one can coherently conceive of an entire ''zombie world'', a world physically indistinguishable from this world but entirely lacking conscious experience. The counterpart of every conscious being in ''our'' world would be a p-zombie. Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is logically possible, which is all the argument requires. Chalmers states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."<ref name="Chalmers2">Chalmers, 2003, p. 5.</ref> The outline structure of Chalmers' version of the zombie argument is as follows;
Most arguments ultimately lend support to some form of [[dualism]]—the view that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two kinds of property): the mental and the physical.


⚫
#According to physicalism a world is not possible in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but in which there are ''additional'' facts. This is because, all facts are fully determined by physical facts so any world that is ''physically'' indistinguishable from our world is ''entirely'' indistinguishable from our world.
⚫
The zombie argument against physicalism is, therefore, a version of a general ''modal argument'' against physicalism, such as that of [[Saul Kripke]]'s in "Naming and Necessity" (1972).<ref>However, note that Kripke's modal argument in "Naming and Necessity" is against only one kind of physicalism: [[type-identity theory]].</ref> The notion of a p-zombie, as used to argue against physicalism, was notably advanced in the 1970s by [[Thomas Nagel]] (1970; 1974) and [[Robert Kirk]] (1974).


#In fact we can conceive of such a world and can not easily see why it is should not be possible, rather it seems the MORE likely outcome of the premises of physicalism.
However, the zombie argument against physicalism in general was most famously developed in detail by [[David Chalmers]] in ''[[The Conscious Mind]]'' (1996). According to Chalmers, one can coherently conceive of an entire ''zombie world'': a world physically indiscernible from our world, but entirely lacking conscious experience. In such a world, the counterpart of every being that is conscious in ''our'' world would be a p-zombie. The structure of Chalmers' version of the zombie argument can be outlined as follows:


⚫
# If physicalism is true, then it is ''not'' possible for there to be a world in which all the physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but in which there are ''additional'' facts. (This is because, according to physicalism, ''all'' the facts are fully determined by the physical facts; so any world that is ''physically'' indistinguishable from our world is ''entirely'' indistinguishable from our world.)
# But there is a possible world in which all the physical facts are the same as those of our world but in which there are additional facts. (For example, it is possible that there is a world exactly like ours in every physical respect, but in it everyone lacks certain mental states, namely any phenomenal experiences or [[qualia]]. The people there look and act just like people in the actual world, but they don't feel anything; when one gets shot, for example, he yells out as if he is in pain, but he doesn't ''feel'' any pain.)
# Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows by [[modus tollens]].)
# Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows by [[modus tollens]].)


==Responses==
The argument is logically [[validity|valid]], in that ''if'' its premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. However, philosophers dispute that its premises are true. For example, concerning premise 2: Is such a zombie world really possible? Chalmers states that "it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description."<ref>Chalmers, 1996, p. 96.</ref> Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is possible; and if such a world is possible, then physicalism is false. Chalmers is arguing only for ''logical'' possibility, and he maintains that this is all that his argument requires. He states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."<ref name="Chalmers2">Chalmers, 2003, p. 5.</ref>
Chalmers' argument is logically [[validity|valid]]: if its premises are true then the conclusion must be true. However, other philosophers dispute that its premises are true. For example, is such a world really possible? Chalmers states that "it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description."<ref>Chalmers, 1996, p. 96.</ref>

This leads to the questions of the relevant notion of "possibility": is the scenario described in premise 2 possible in the sense that is suggested in premise 1? Most physicalist responses deny that the premise of a zombie scenario is possible.
⚫
This leads to the following questions: What is the relevant notion of possibility here? Is the scenario in premise 2 possible in the sense that is suggested in premise 1? Some philosophers maintain that the relevant kind of possibility is not so weak as [[logical possibility]]. They argue that, while a zombie world is logically possible (that is, there is no logical contradiction in any full description of the scenario), such a weak notion is not relevant in the analysis of a [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] thesis such as physicalism. Most philosophers agree that the relevant notion of possibility is some sort of [[metaphysical possibility]]. What the proponent of the zombie argument claims is that one can tell from the armchair, just by the power of reason, that such a zombie scenario is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states: "From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility."<ref name="Chalmers2"/> Chalmers claims that this inference from conceivability to metaphysical possibility is not generally legitimate, but it is legitimate for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness.<ref>Chalmers (2004) argues that we must adhere to "Kripke's insight that for phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference (or between primary and secondary intentions)." That is, for phenomenal concepts, conceivability implies possibility.</ref> Indeed, according to Chalmers, whatever is logically possible is also, in the sense relevant here, metaphysically possible.<ref>Chalmers, 1996, pp. 67-68.</ref>


⚫
Some philosophers maintain that a possibility stronger than [[logical possibility]] ia required and that, while a zombie world is logically possible (that is, there is no logical contradiction in any full description of the scenario), such a weak notion is not relevant in the analysis of a [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] thesis such as physicalism. Most agree that the relevant notion of possibility is some sort of [[metaphysical possibility]]. The zombie argument claims that one can tell by the power of reason that such a "zombie scenario" is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states; "From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility"<ref name="Chalmers2"/> and argues that this inference from conceivability to metaphysical possibility, while it is not generally legitimate, is legitimate for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness since we must adhere to "Kripke's insight that for phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference (or between primary and secondary intentions)." That is, for phenomenal concepts, conceivability implies possibility. According to Chalmers, whatever is logically possible is also, in the sense relevant here, metaphysically possible.<ref>Chalmers, 1996, pp. 67-68.</ref>
==Criticism==
A physicalist might respond to the zombie argument in several ways. Most responses deny premise two (of Chalmers' version above); that is, they deny that a zombie scenario is possible.


One response is to claim that the idea of qualia and related phenomenal notions of the mind are not coherent concepts, and the zombie scenario is therefore incoherent. [[Daniel Dennett]] and others take this line. They argue that while consciousness, subjective experiences, and so forth exist in some sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims they are; pain, for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences. Dennett coined the term ''zimboes'' (philosophical zombies that have second-order beliefs) to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is incoherent<ref>Dennett 1995; 1999</ref>. He states: "Philosophers ought to have dropped the zombie like a hot potato, but since they persist in their embrace, this gives me a golden opportunity to focus attention on the most seductive error in current thinking."<ref name="Dennett, 1995, p. 322">Dennett, 1995, p. 322.</ref> In a related vein, Nigel Thomas argues that the zombie concept is inherently self-contradictory: Because zombies, ''ex hypothesis'', behave just like regular humans, they will ''claim'' to be conscious. Thomas argues that any construal of this claim (that is, whether it is taken to be true, false, or neither true nor false) inevitably entails either a contradiction or a manifest absurdity.<ref>Thomas, 1998.</ref><ref>http://www.imagery-imagination.com/zom-abs.htm</ref>
Another response is denial of the idea that qualia and related phenomenal notions of the mind are in the first place coherent concepts. [[Daniel Dennett]] and others argue that while consciousness, subjective experiences exist in some sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims they are. The experience of pain, for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences.


⚫
[[Daniel Dennett]] argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition" <ref name="Dennett, 1995, p. 322"/>. Dennett coined the term ''zimboes'' (philosophical zombies that have second-order beliefs) to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is incoherent<ref>Dennett 1995; 1999</ref>. "Zimboes think<sup>Z</sup> they are conscious, think<sup>Z</sup> they have qualia, think<sup>Z</sup> they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!"<ref name="Dennett, 1995, p. 322"/>. Zombies in an observed world would be indistinguishable from the observer and therefore non-existent) one must either believe that anyone, including oneself, might be a zombie or else that no one may be a zombie. One's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is no different from anyone else's. When a distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself (assumed not to be a zombie), this concept of oneself (under reductive physicalism) may ever only correspond to physical reality and the concept of the hypothetical zombie, which is only a subset of the concept of oneself, and will entail a deficit in observables (cognitive systems), a "seductive error"<ref name="Dennett, 1995, p. 322">Dennett, 1995, p. 322.</ref> contradicting the original definition of a zombie.
⚫
[[Artificial intelligence]] researcher [[Marvin Minsky]] claims that the argument is simply [[circular reasoning|circular]]. By proposing the possibility of something which is physically identical to a human but has no subjective experiences, the argument is implicitly assuming that the physical characteristics of humans are ''not'' what produces those experiences. But that is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.<ref>http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/minsky_p2.html</ref>


⚫
Nigel Thomas argues that the zombie concept is self-contradictory in that, since zombies ''ex hypothesi'' behave just like regular humans, they will ''claim'' to be conscious, which, whether this claim is taken to be true, false, or neither true nor false, inevitably entails either a contradiction or a manifest absurdity.<ref>Thomas, 1998, see http://www.imagery-imagination.com/zom-abs.htm</ref> [[Artificial intelligence]] researcher [[Marvin Minsky]] sees the argument as [[circular reasoning|circular]]. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are ''not'' what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.<ref>http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/minsky_p2.html</ref>
⚫
Another physicalist response is to provide an [[error theory]] to account for intuition that zombies are possible. Philosophers such as [[Stephen Yablo]] (1998) have taken this line and argued that notions of what counts as physical, and what counts as physically ''possible'', change over time; so while [[conceptual analysis]] is reliable in some areas of philosophy, it is not reliable here. Yablo says he is "''braced'' for the information that is going to make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no real idea what form the information is going to take."<ref>Yablo, 2000, §XV.</ref>


⚫
[[Stephen Yablo]]'s (1998) response is to provide an [[error theory]] to account for the intuition that zombies are possible. Notions of what counts as physical and as physically ''possible'' change over time so [[conceptual analysis]] is not reliable here. Yablo says he is "''braced'' for the information that is going to make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no real idea what form the information is going to take."<ref>Yablo, 2000, §XV.</ref>
⚫
The zombie argument is difficult to assess, because it brings to light fundamental disagreements that philosophers have about the method and scope of philosophy itself. It gets to the core of disagreements about the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument, such as Chalmers, think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great deal of philosophical work. However, others, such as Dennett, [[Paul Churchland]], [[W.V.O. Quine]], and so on, have fundamentally different views from Chalmers about the nature and scope of philosophical analysis. For this reason, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.


⚫
The zombie argument is difficult to assess because it brings to light fundamental disagreements about the method and scope of philosophy itself and the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument may think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great deal of philosophical work. However others, such as Dennett, [[Paul Churchland]] and [[W.V.O. Quine]], have fundamentally different views. For this reason, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.
⚫
Under [[physicalism]], it has been claimed that one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie – following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. This argument has been expressed by [[Daniel Dennett]] who argues that "Zimboes think<sup>Z</sup> they are conscious, think<sup>Z</sup> they have qualia, think<sup>Z</sup> they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!"<ref name="Dennett, 1995, p. 322"/>. While it has been argued that zombies in an observed world are indistinguishable from the observer (and therefore non-existent) under the assumption of physicalism, it has also been argued that zombies are not conceivable. It has been claimed under reductive [[physicalism]], that when a distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself (assumed not to be a zombie), and noting that the concept of oneself under reductive physicalism may ever only correspond to physical reality, the concept of the hypothetical zombie can only be a subset of the concept of oneself and will in this nature also entail a deficit in observables (cognitive systems) thereby contradicting the original definition of a zombie. This argument has been expressed by [[Daniel Dennett]] who argues that, "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition" <ref name="Dennett, 1995, p. 322"/>.


==See also==
==See also==

Revision as of 04:25, 24 March 2011

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).

The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly arguments against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism).

Types of zombie

Though philosophical zombies are widely used in thought experiments, the detailed articulation of the concept is not always the same. P-zombies were introduced primarily to argue against specific types of physicalism such as behaviorism, according to which mental states exist solely as behavior: belief, desire, thought, consciousness, and so on, are simply certain kinds of behavior or tendencies towards behaviors. A p-zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a normal human being but lacks conscious experiences is therefore not logically possible according to the behaviorist, so an appeal to the logical possibility of a p-zombie furnishes an argument that behaviorism is false. Behaviorists tend to respond that a p-zombie is not possible.

The unifying idea of the zombie is of a human that has no conscious experience, but one might distinguish various types of zombie used in different thought experiments as follows;

  • A behavioral zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human.
  • A neurological zombie that has a human brain and is generallu physiologically indistinguishable from a human.
  • A soulless zombie that lacks a soul.

Zombie arguments

Main article: Zombie argument

Zombie arguments often support lines of reasoning that aim to show that zombies are logically possible in order support some form of dualism — the view that the world includes two kinds of substance (or perhaps two kinds of property); the mental and the physical. According to physicalism, physical facts determine all other facts. Since any fact other than that of consciousness may be held to be the same for a p-zombie and a normal conscious human, it follows that physicalism must hold that p-zombies are either not possible or are the same as normal humans.

The zombie argument against physicalism is a version of a general modal argument against physicalism such as that of Saul Kripke,[1] against that kind of physicalism known as type-identity theory. Further such arguments were notably advanced in the 1970s by Thomas Nagel (1970; 1974) and Robert Kirk (1974) but the general argument was most famously developed in detail by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind (1996).

According to Chalmers one can coherently conceive of an entire zombie world, a world physically indistinguishable from this world but entirely lacking conscious experience. The counterpart of every conscious being in our world would be a p-zombie. Since such a world is conceivable, Chalmers claims, it is logically possible, which is all the argument requires. Chalmers states: "Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature."[2] The outline structure of Chalmers' version of the zombie argument is as follows;

  1. According to physicalism a world is not possible in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world but in which there are additional facts. This is because, all facts are fully determined by physical facts so any world that is physically indistinguishable from our world is entirely indistinguishable from our world.
  1. In fact we can conceive of such a world and can not easily see why it is should not be possible, rather it seems the MORE likely outcome of the premises of physicalism.
  1. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows by modus tollens.)

Responses

Chalmers' argument is logically valid: if its premises are true then the conclusion must be true. However, other philosophers dispute that its premises are true. For example, is such a world really possible? Chalmers states that "it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description."[3] This leads to the questions of the relevant notion of "possibility": is the scenario described in premise 2 possible in the sense that is suggested in premise 1? Most physicalist responses deny that the premise of a zombie scenario is possible.

Some philosophers maintain that a possibility stronger than logical possibility ia required and that, while a zombie world is logically possible (that is, there is no logical contradiction in any full description of the scenario), such a weak notion is not relevant in the analysis of a metaphysical thesis such as physicalism. Most agree that the relevant notion of possibility is some sort of metaphysical possibility. The zombie argument claims that one can tell by the power of reason that such a "zombie scenario" is metaphysically possible. Chalmers states; "From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility"[2] and argues that this inference from conceivability to metaphysical possibility, while it is not generally legitimate, is legitimate for phenomenal concepts such as consciousness since we must adhere to "Kripke's insight that for phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference (or between primary and secondary intentions)." That is, for phenomenal concepts, conceivability implies possibility. According to Chalmers, whatever is logically possible is also, in the sense relevant here, metaphysically possible.[4]

Another response is denial of the idea that qualia and related phenomenal notions of the mind are in the first place coherent concepts. Daniel Dennett and others argue that while consciousness, subjective experiences exist in some sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims they are. The experience of pain, for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences.

Daniel Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition" [5]. Dennett coined the term zimboes (philosophical zombies that have second-order beliefs) to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is incoherent[6]. "Zimboes thinkZ they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!"[5]. Zombies in an observed world would be indistinguishable from the observer and therefore non-existent) one must either believe that anyone, including oneself, might be a zombie or else that no one may be a zombie. One's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is no different from anyone else's. When a distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself (assumed not to be a zombie), this concept of oneself (under reductive physicalism) may ever only correspond to physical reality and the concept of the hypothetical zombie, which is only a subset of the concept of oneself, and will entail a deficit in observables (cognitive systems), a "seductive error"[5] contradicting the original definition of a zombie.

Nigel Thomas argues that the zombie concept is self-contradictory in that, since zombies ex hypothesi behave just like regular humans, they will claim to be conscious, which, whether this claim is taken to be true, false, or neither true nor false, inevitably entails either a contradiction or a manifest absurdity.[7] Artificial intelligence researcher Marvin Minsky sees the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.[8]

Stephen Yablo's (1998) response is to provide an error theory to account for the intuition that zombies are possible. Notions of what counts as physical and as physically possible change over time so conceptual analysis is not reliable here. Yablo says he is "braced for the information that is going to make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no real idea what form the information is going to take."[9]

The zombie argument is difficult to assess because it brings to light fundamental disagreements about the method and scope of philosophy itself and the nature and abilities of conceptual analysis. Proponents of the zombie argument may think that conceptual analysis is a central part of (if not the only part of) philosophy and that it certainly can do a great deal of philosophical work. However others, such as Dennett, Paul Churchland and W.V.O. Quine, have fundamentally different views. For this reason, discussion of the zombie argument remains vigorous in philosophy.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972)
  2. ^ a b Chalmers, 2003, p. 5.
  3. ^ Chalmers, 1996, p. 96.
  4. ^ Chalmers, 1996, pp. 67-68.
  5. ^ a b c Dennett, 1995, p. 322.
  6. ^ Dennett 1995; 1999
  7. ^ Thomas, 1998, see http://www.imagery-imagination.com/zom-abs.htm
  8. ^ http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/minsky/minsky_p2.html
  9. ^ Yablo, 2000, §XV.

References and further reading

  • Chalmers, David. 1995. "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 200–219. Online PDF
  • Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hardcover: ISBN 0-19-511789-1, paperback: ISBN 0-19-510553-2
  • Chalmers, David. 2003. "Consciousness and its Place in Nature", in the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, S. Stich and F. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell. Also in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford, 2002. ISBN 0-19-514581-X, Online PDF
  • Chalmers, David. 2004. "Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 68, no. 1. Online text
  • Dennett, Daniel. 1995. "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies", Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 322–326. Online abstract
  • Dennett, Daniel. 1999. "The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?", Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture. Online text
  • Kirk, Robert. 1974. "Sentience and Behaviour", Mind, vol. 83, pp. 43–60.
  • Kripke, Saul. 1972. "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman, Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, pp. 253–355. (Published as a book in 1980, Harvard University Press.)
  • Nagel, Thomas. 1970. "Armstrong on the Mind", Philosophical Review, vol. 79, pp. 394–403.
  • Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review, vol. 83, pp. 435–450.
  • Thomas, N.J.T. 1998. "Zombie Killer", in S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kaszniak, & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates (pp. 171–177), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Online
  • Yablo, Stephen. 2000. "Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 81, pp. 98–122. Online text

External links

  • Online papers on philosophical zombies, by various authors, compiled by David Chalmers.
  • Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind
  • Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  • Skepdic entry on p-zombies
  • A Qwantz comic on the subject of philosophical zombies
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