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Democratic backsliding or autocratization^[1]^[2]^[a] is the decline in the democratic characteristics of a political system:^[8] the opposite of democratization.

While regime change through military coups has declined since the end of the Cold War, more subtle forms of backsliding have increased. During the third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century, many new, weakly institutionalized democracies were established. Precisely these regimes are most vulnerable to democratic backsliding.^[9]^[10] The third wave of autocratization has been ongoing since 2010, when the number of liberal democracies was at an all-time high.^[11]

In democracies, democratic decline is caused by the state-led weakening of political institutions that sustain the democratic system, such as the peaceful transition of power or free and fair elections. Although these political elements are assumed to lead to the onset of backsliding, the violation of individual rights that underpin democracy, especially freedom of expression, questions the health, efficiency and sustainability of democratic systems over time.^[12]^[10] During national crises, there are unique risks of democratic backsliding. It can occur when leaders impose autocratic rules during states of emergency that are either disproportionate to the severity of the crisis or remain in place after the situation has improved.^[13]

Manifestations

Democratic backsliding occurs when essential components of democracy are threatened. Examples of democratic backsliding include:^[14]^[15]

Free and fair elections are degraded;^[14]
Liberal rights of freedom of speech, press^[16] and association decline, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government, hold it to account, and propose alternatives to the current regime;^[14]^[16]
The rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government) is weakened,^[14] such as when the independence of the judiciary is threatened, or when civil service tenure protections are weakened or eliminated.^[17]
An over-emphasis on national security as response to acts of terrorism or perceived antagonists.^[17]

Forms

Democratic backsliding can occur in several common ways. Backsliding is often led by democratically elected leaders, who use "incremental rather than revolutionary" tactics."^[18] As emphasized by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, it is difficult to pinpoint a single specific moment at which a government is no longer democratic, given that this process of decline manifests "slowly, in barely visible steps".^[19] Ozan Varol uses the phrase stealth authoritarianism to describe the practice of an authoritarian leader (or a potential authoritarian leader) using "seemingly legitimate legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends ... concealing anti-democratic practices under the mask of law."^[20] Together with Juan Linz (1996),^[21] Levitsky and Ziblatt developed and agreed upon their "litmus test", which includes what they believe to be the four key indicators of authoritarian behavior. These four factors are: rejection (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game, denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, toleration or encouragement of violence, and readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. Varol describes the manipulation of libel laws, electoral laws, or "terrorism" laws as tools to target or discredit political opponents, and the employment of democratic rhetoric as a distraction from anti-democratic practices, as manifestations of stealth authoritarianism.^[20] In addition to these key signs derived from the behavior of leaders, Samuel P. Huntington also describes culture as a main contributor to democratic backsliding, and goes on to argue that certain cultures are particularly hostile to democracy, but they don’t necessarily prohibit democratization.^[22]

Promissory coups

In a promissory coup, an incumbent elected government is deposed in a coup d'etat by coup leaders who claim to defend democracy and promise to hold elections to restore democracy. In these situations, coup-makers emphasize the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention in order to ensure democracy in the future.^[9] This is unlike the more open-ended coups that occurred during the Cold War. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo says that "The share of successful coups that falls into the promissory category has risen significantly, from 35 percent before 1990 to 85 percent afterward."^[9] Examining 12 promissory coups in democratic states between 1990 and 2012, Bermeo found that "Few promissory coups were followed quickly by competitive elections, and fewer still paved the way for improved democracies."^[9]

Executive aggrandizement

This process contains a series of institutional changes by the elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government and hold it to account. The most important feature of executive aggrandizement is that the institutional changes are made through legal channels, making it seem as if the elected official has a democratic mandate.^[9]^[19] Some examples of executive aggrandizement are the decline of media freedom and the weakening of the rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government), such as when judicial autonomy is threatened.^[9]

Over time, there has been a decline in active coups (in which a power-seeking individual, or small group, seizes power through forcibly, violently removing an existing government) and self-coups (involving "a freely elected chief executive suspending the constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep") and an increase in executive aggrandizement.^[9] Political scientist Nancy Bermeo notes that executive aggrandizement occurs over time, through institutional changes legitimized through legal means, such as new constituent assemblies, referenda, or "existing courts or legislatures ... in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies."^[9] Bermeo notes that these methods mean that the aggrandizement of the executive "can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate."^[9] Executive aggrandizement is characterized by the presence of distress in axes of democracy, including institutional or horizontal accountability;^[24] and executive or discursive accountability.^[25]

Strategic harassment and manipulation during elections

This form of democratic backsliding entails the impairment of free and fair elections through tactics such as blocking media access, disqualifying opposition leaders, or harassing opponents. This form of backsliding is done in such a way that the elections do not appear to be rigged and rarely involves any apparent violations of the law, making it difficult for international election monitoring organizations to observe or criticize these misconducts.^[9]

Causes and characteristics of democratic backsliding

Populism

Pippa Norris of the Harvard Kennedy School and the University of Sydney argues that the two "twin forces" pose the largest threat to Western liberal democracies: "sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears."^[26] Norris defines populism as "a governing style with three defining features":

A rhetorical emphasis on the idea that "legitimate political authority is based on popular sovereignty and majority rule";
Disapproval of, and challenges to the legitimacy of, established holders of "political, cultural, and economic power";
Leadership by "maverick outsiders" who claim "to speak for the vox populi and to serve ordinary people."^[26]

Some, but not all, populists are also authoritarian, emphasizing "the importance of protecting traditional lifestyles against perceived threats from 'outsiders', even at the expense of civil liberties and minority rights."^[26] According to Norris, the reinforcement of the insecurities from the "twin forces" has led to more support for populist-authoritarian leaders, and this latter risk was especially pronounced in the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. For example, Norris argues that Trump benefited from the mistrust of "the establishment" and that he continuously sought to undermine faith in the legitimacy of the media and the independence of the courts.^[26]

In 2017, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovire Kaltwasser wrote that:

Populism does not have the same effect in each stage of the democratization process. In fact, we suggest that populism tends to play a positive role in the promotion of electoral or minimal democracy, but a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a full-fledged liberal democratic regime. Consequently, while populism tends to favor the democratization of authoritarian regimes, it is prone to diminish the quality of liberal democracies. Populism supports popular sovereignty, but it is inclined to oppose any limitations on majority rule, such as judicial independence and minority rights. Populism-in-power has led to processes of de-democratization (e.g., [Viktor] Orbán in Hungary or [Hugo] Chávez in Venezuela) and, in some extreme cases, even to the breakdown of the democratic regime (e.g., [Alberto] Fujimori in Peru).^[27]

A 2018 analysis by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle links populism to democratic backsliding, showing that since 1990, "13 right-wing populist governments have been elected; of these, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Over the same time period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number, five, brought about significant democratic backsliding."^[28]

A December 2018 report by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change concluded that populist rule, whether left- or right-wing, leads to a significant risk of democratic backsliding. The authors examine the effect of populism on three major aspects of democracy: the quality of democracy in general, checks and balances on executive power and citizens' right to politically participate in a meaningful way. They conclude that populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. Also, more than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten the countries' constitution, frequently in a way that eroded checks and balances on executive power. Lastly, populists attack individual rights such as freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights.^[18]

In a 2018 journal article on democratic backsliding, scholars Licia Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley argued that the emergence of populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Andrej Babiš's ANO in the Czech Republic, are "a potentially ambiguous phenomenon, articulating genuine societal demands for political reform and pushing issues of good governance centre stage, but further loosening the weak checks and balances that characterise post-communist democracy and embedding private interests at the core of the state."^[29]

In a 2019 paper, presented to the International Society of Political Psychologists, Shawn Rosenberg argues that right-wing populism is exposing a vulnerability in democratic structures and that "democracy is likely to devour itself."^[30]

Conflict and fear

The territorial peace theory asserts that peace and stable borders between neighbor countries facilitates democratization, while conflict and territorial threats foster authoritarian attitudes and disregard for democratic values.^[31]

The threat that makes the population accept a centralization of power and a less democratic system is sometimes deliberately fabricated. There are many historical examples of political leaders who engage in psychological manipulation of their own population through fearmongering, exaggeration of dangers, or even creation of false flag attacks in order to augment their own power. In other cases, the threats are fabricated by foreign powers who engage in psychological warfare and a strategy of tension in order to facilitate an authoritarian coup.^[32]^[33]

Economic inequality and social discontent

Many political economy scholars, such as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have investigated the effect of income inequality on the democratic breakdown.^[8] Studies of democratic collapse show that economic inequality is significantly higher in countries that eventually move towards a more authoritarian model.^[34] Hungary is an example of a country where a large group of unemployed, low-educated people were dissatisfied with the high levels of inequality, especially after the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Viktor Orbán used this dissatisfaction of a relatively large segment of the population to his advantage, winning popular support by using national-populist rhetoric.^[35]

Personalism

A 2019 study found that personalism had an adverse impact on democracy in Latin America: "presidents who dominate their own weakly organized parties are more likely to seek to concentrate power, undermine horizontal accountability, and trample the rule of law than presidents who preside over parties that have an independent leadership and an institutionalized bureaucracy."^[36]

COVID-19

Many national governments worldwide found themselves with no other choice but to delay, postpone or cancel a variety of democratic elections at both national and subnational governmental levels resulting in the COVID-19 pandemic opening gaps in the action of democracy.^[37]^[38]

At the beginning of the crisis UN experts advised government responses to be "proportionate, necessary and non-discriminatory".^[39] According to the V-Dem Institute, only 39% of all countries have committed no or minor violations of democratic standards in response to COVID-19.^[40] Regardless of the fact that liberal democracy was on the defensive and experiencing a rise of autocrats and authoritarian regimes in many parts of the world prior to the first coronavirus death in December 2019, the pandemic has had a major influence on democratic backsliding.^[41]

In Cambodia, some individuals who expressed concerns about the spread of COVID-19 have been arrested on "fake news" charges.^[42]^[43] In the Philippines,^[44] India,^[45]^[46] Egypt,^[47] Bangladesh,^[48] Morocco,^[49] Pakistan,^[50] Montenegro,^[51] Indonesia,^[46] Mongolia,^[46] Sri Lanka,^[46] Kenya, South Africa,^[52] Nigeria,^[53] Ethiopia,^[54] Cote d'Ivoire,^[55] Somalia,^[56] Mauritius,^[57] Zimbabwe,^[58] Thailand,^[59] Malaysia^[60] Singapore,^[61]^[62] and Hong Kong, people have been arrested for allegedly spreading "fake news" about the COVID-19 pandemic.^[63]^[46] The Turkish Interior Ministry has been arresting social media users whose posts were "targeting officials and spreading panic and fear by suggesting the virus had spread widely in Turkey and that officials had taken insufficient measures".^[64]

Great power politics

Great power transitions have contributed to democratic backsliding and the spread of authoritarianism in two ways: "First, the sudden rise of autocratic Great Powers led to waves of autocracy driven by conquest but also by self-interest and even admiration, as in the fascist wave of the 1930s or the post-1945 communist wave. Second, the sudden rise of democratic hegemons led to waves of democratization, but these waves inevitably overextended and collapsed, leading to failed consolidation and rollback."^[65]

Cultural conservatism

Global variation in democracy is primarily explained by variance between popular adherence to authoritarian values vs. emancipative values, which explains around 70 percent of the variation of democracy between countries every year since 1960. Emancipative values, as measured by the World Values Survey, have been consistently rising over time in response to increasing economic prosperity.^[66]

A 2020 study, which used World Values Survey data, found that cultural conservatism was the ideological group most open to authoritarian governance within Western democracies. Within English-speaking Western democracies, "protection-based" attitudes combining cultural conservatism and leftist economic attitudes were the strongest predictor of support for authoritarian modes of governance.^[67]

Prof. Jessica Stern and political psychologist Karen Stenner write that international research finds that "perceptions of sociocultural threat" (such as rising ethnic diversity, tolerance for LGBT people) are more important in explaining how democracies turn authoritarian compared to economic inequality (though they do include economic threats such as globalization and the rising prosperity of other ethnic groups).^[68] Stern and Stenner say about a third of the population in Western countries is predisposed to favor homogeneity, obedience, and strong leaders over diversity and freedom. In their view, authoritarianism is only loosely correlated with conservatism, which may defend a liberal democracy as the status quo.

Political scientist Christian Welzel argues that the third wave of democratization overshot the demand for democracy in some countries. Therefore, Welzel sees the current autocratization trend as regression to the mean, but expects that it too will reverse in response to long-term changes in values.^[66]

Polarization, misinformation, incrementalism, and multi-factor explanations

The 2019 Annual Democracy Report of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg identified three challenges confronting global democracy: (1) "Government manipulation of media, civil society, rule of law, and elections"; (2) rising "toxic polarization", including "the division of society into distrustful, antagonistic camps"; diminishing "respect for opponents, factual reasoning, and engagement with society" among political elites; and increasing use of hate speech by political leaders; and (3) foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily digital, and mostly affecting Taiwan, the United States, and former Soviet bloc nations such as Latvia.^[69]

According to Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. Lieberman, four characteristics have typically provided the conditions for democratic backsliding (alone or in combination): Political polarization, racism and nativism, economic inequality, and excessive executive power.^[70]^[71]^[72] Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman highlight three key causes of backsliding: "the pernicious effects of polarization; realignments of party systems that enable elected autocrats to gain legislative power; and the incremental nature of derogations, which divides oppositions and keeps them off balance."^[73] A 2022 study linked polarization to support for undemocratic politicians.^[74]

Prevalence and trends

A study by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, which contains more than eighteen-million data points relevant to democracy, measuring 350 highly specific indicators across 174 countries as of the end of 2016, found that the number of democracies in the world modestly declined from 100 in 2011 to 97 in 2017; some countries moved toward democracy, while other countries moved away from democracy.^[75] V-Dem's 2019 Annual Democracy Report found that the trend of autocratization continued, while "24 countries are now severely affected by what is established as a 'third wave of autocratization'" including "populous countries such as Brazil, Bangladesh and the United States, as well as several Eastern European countries" (specifically Bulgaria and Serbia).^[69] The report found that an increasing proportion of the world population lived in countries undergoing autocratization (2.3 billion in 2018).^[69] The report found that while the majority of countries were democracies, the number of liberal democracies declined to 39 by 2018 (down from 44 a decade earlier).^[69] The research group Freedom House, in reports in 2017 and 2019, identified democratic backsliding in a variety of regions across the world.^[76]^[77] Freedom House's 2019 Freedom in the World report, titled Democracy in Retreat, showed freedom of expression declining each year over the preceding 13 years, with sharper drops since 2012.^[78]

Scholarly work in the 2010s detailed democratic backsliding, in various forms and to various extents, in Hungary and Poland,^[29] the Czech Republic,^[79] Turkey,^[80]^[81] Brazil, Venezuela^[82]^[83] and India.^[84]

The scholarly recognition of the concept of democratic backsliding reflects a reversal from older views, which held "that democracy, once attained in a fairly wealthy state, would become a permanent fixture."^[14] This older view came to be realized as erroneous beginning in the mid-2000s, as multiple scholars acknowledged that some seemingly-stable democracies have recently faced a decline in the quality of their democracy.^[34] Huq and Ginsburg identified in an academic paper "37 instances in 25 different countries in the postwar period in which democratic quality declined significantly (though a fully authoritarian regime didn't emerge)", including countries that were "seemingly stable, reasonably wealthy" democracies.^[17]

The 2020 report of the Varieties of Democracy Institute found that the global share of democracies declined from 54% in 2009 to 49% in 2019, and that a greater share of the global population lived in autocratizing countries (6% in 2009, 34% in 2019).^[85] The 10 countries with the highest degree of democratizing from 2009 to 2019 were Tunisia, Armenia, The Gambia, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Myanmar, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan, Ecuador, and Niger; the 10 countries with the highest degree of autocratizing from 2009 to 2019 were Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Serbia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Mali, Thailand, Nicaragua, and Zambia.^[85] However, the institute found that signs of hope in an "unprecedented degree of mobilization for democracy" as reflected in increases in pro-democracy mass mobilization; the proportion of countries with "substantial pro-democracy mass protests" increased to 44% in 2019 (from 27% in 2009).^[85]

According to a 2020 study, "Democratic backsliding does not necessarily see all democratic institutions erode in parallel fashion... we establish that elections are improving and rights are retracting in the same time period, and in many of the same cases."^[86]

Central and Eastern Europe

In the 2010s, a scholarly consensus developed that the Central and Eastern Europe region was experiencing democratic backsliding, most prominently in Hungary and Poland^[29] and the European Union failed to prevent democratic backsliding in some of its other member states.^[87]^[88] Rutgers University political scientist R. Daniel Kelemen argues that EU membership has enabled an "authoritarian equilibrium" and may even make it easier for authoritarian-minded leaders to erode democracy, due to the EU's system of party politics, a reluctance to interfere in domestic political matters; appropriation of EU funds by backsliding regimes; and free movement for dissatisfied citizens (which allows citizens to leave backsliding regimes, thus depleting the opposition and strengthening the regimes).^[87] According to Dalia Research's 2020 poll, only 38 percent of Polish citizens and 36 percent of Hungarian citizens believe that their countries are democratic, while the rest saying they would like their countries to be more democratic.^[89]

Effects of judicial independence

A 2011 study examined the effects of judicial independence in preventing democratic backsliding. The study, which analyzed 163 nations from 1960 to 2000, concluded that established independent judiciaries are successful at preventing democracies from drifting to authoritarianism, but that states with newly formed courts "are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies".^[90]

References

^ Other names include: democratic decline,^[3] de-democratization,^[4] democratic erosion,^[5] democratic decay,^[6] democratic recession,^[7] and democratic regression^[3]

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 ===Central and Eastern Europe===
 In the 2010s, a scholarly consensus developed that the [[Central and Eastern Europe]] region was experiencing democratic backsliding, most prominently in [[Hungary]] and [[Poland]]<ref name="Cianetti" /> and the [[European Union]] failed to prevent democratic backsliding in some of its other [[European Union member states|member states]].<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last=Kelemen|first=R. Daniel|date=February 2020|title=The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium|language=en|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455?journalCode=rjpp20|volume=20|journal=Journal of European Public Policy|issue=3|pages=481–499|doi=10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455|s2cid=221055795|access-date=25 August 2020|archive-date=29 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201129184117/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455?journalCode=rjpp20|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Kelemen|first=R. Daniel|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/02/eu-is-supposed-promote-democracy-so-why-do-anti-democratic-politicians-thrive-within-it/|newspaper=Washington Post|date=2 December 2019|title=The E.U. is supposed to promote democracy. So why do anti-democratic politicians thrive within it?|access-date=25 August 2020|archive-date=2 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210302014859/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/02/eu-is-supposed-promote-democracy-so-why-do-anti-democratic-politicians-thrive-within-it/|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Rutgers University]] political scientist [[R. Daniel Kelemen]] argues that EU membership has enabled an "authoritarian equilibrium" and may even make it easier for authoritarian-minded leaders to erode democracy, due to the EU's system of party politics, a reluctance to interfere in domestic political matters; appropriation of EU funds by backsliding regimes; and [[Freedom of movement for workers in the European Union|free movement]] for dissatisfied citizens (which allows citizens to leave backsliding regimes, thus depleting the opposition and strengthening the regimes).<ref name=":10" /> According to Dalia Research's 2020 poll, only 38 percent of Polish citizens and 36 percent of Hungarian citizens believe that their countries are democratic, while the rest saying they would like their countries to be more democratic.<ref>{{cite news |title=Most Poles, Hungarians don't think their countries are democratic: poll |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/minorities-in-poland-hungary-think-their-countries-are-democratic-report/ |access-date=4 November 2020 |work=POLITICO |date=15 June 2020 |archive-date=17 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161215/https://www.politico.eu/article/minorities-in-poland-hungary-think-their-countries-are-democratic-report/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
-==== Czech Republic ====
-The coinciding tenure from 2017 to 2021 of [[ANO 2011]] leader [[Andrej Babiš]] and his ally, President [[Miloš Zeman]], has been described by analysts Sean Hanley and Milada Anna Vachudova as a period of democratic backsliding, albeit to a less drastic degree than Poland or Hungary.<ref>{{cite journal|journal=East European Politics|volume=34|issue=3|first=Sean|last=Hanley|title=Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic}}</ref> However, other academics such as Elisabeth Bakke and Nick Sitter have disputed this, describing it as "conceptual stretching" and claiming that "exceptional factors" that existed in Hungary and Poland are not applicable to the Czech Republic.<ref name="bakke"/>
-==== Georgia ====
-Georgia's governing party, [[Georgian Dream]] (GD), was accused of democratic backsliding in a 2019 report by the [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]], for failing to approve more representative electoral reform proposals.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80542|title=Georgia's Dangerous Slide Away From Democracy|website=Carnegie Europe|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205095701/https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80542|url-status=live}}</ref> U.S. Senators [[Jim Risch]] and [[Jeanne Shaheen]] accused Prime Minister [[Giorgi Gakharia]] of backsliding for not implementing the reforms.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/us-senators-concern-georgia-democracy-backsliding/30406183.html|title=U.S. Senators Express Concerns Of Georgian 'Backsliding' On Democracy|website=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=25 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201125025813/https://www.rferl.org/a/us-senators-concern-georgia-democracy-backsliding/30406183.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The electoral system was ultimately reformed ahead of the [[2020 Georgian parliamentary election]] in a compromise between the Georgian government and the opposition.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://freedomhouse.org/article/georgia-government-and-opposition-join-forces-electoral-reform-compromise|title=Georgia: Government and Opposition Join Forces on Electoral Reform Compromise|website=Freedom House|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=14 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114193134/https://freedomhouse.org/article/georgia-government-and-opposition-join-forces-electoral-reform-compromise|url-status=live}}</ref>
-Iulia-Sabina Joja of the [[Middle East Institute]] has disputed allegations of democratic backsliding against the Georgian government, stating that "Georgia has fared well over the last eight years and GD has stayed on the path of democratization and reform" and drawing attention to Georgian improvements on corruption perception and press freedom indices.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Middle East Institute]]|first=Iulia-Sabina|last=Joja|title=Georgian Elections 2020: A strong mandate for democratization and Westernization|url=https://www.mei.edu/publications/georgian-elections-2020-strong-mandate-democratization-and-westernization|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161154/https://www.mei.edu/publications/georgian-elections-2020-strong-mandate-democratization-and-westernization|url-status=live}}</ref>
-==== Hungary ====
-Since 2010, Hungary under [[Viktor Orbán]] and his right-wing [[Fidesz]] party has been described as a prominent example of democratic backsliding.<ref name="Cianetti" /><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/europe/hungary-orban-democracy-far-right.html|title=As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What's Possible|last=Kingsley|first=Patrick|date=10 February 2018|work=The New York Times|access-date=27 May 2019|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=5 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181005202937/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/europe/hungary-orban-democracy-far-right.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bozóki|first1=András|last2=Hegedűs|first2=Dániel|date=3 October 2018|title=An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union|journal=Democratization|volume=25|issue=7|pages=1173–1189|doi=10.1080/13510347.2018.1455664|issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite journal|last=Bogaards|first=Matthijs|date=17 November 2018|title=De-democratization in Hungary: diffusely defective democracy|journal=Democratization|volume=25|issue=8|pages=1481–1499|doi=10.1080/13510347.2018.1485015|issn=1351-0347|doi-access=free}}</ref> As in Poland, political interference by the legislative and executive branches of government threatens the institutional independence of the judiciary.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web|url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=eur27/2051/2020&language=en|title=Hungary: Fearing the Unknown - How Rising Control Is Undermining Judicial Independence in Hungary|date=6 April 2020|website=www.amnesty.org|language=en|access-date=26 April 2020|archive-date=9 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109005958/https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=eur27%2F2051%2F2020&language=en|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2012, the [[National Assembly (Hungary)|legislature]] abruptly lowered the age of retirement for judges from 70 to 62, forcing 57 experienced court leaders (including the President of the [[Supreme Court of Hungary|Supreme Court]]) to retire.<ref name=":8">{{Cite web|url=https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2012)001-e.aspx|title=Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts of Hungary, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 90th Plenary Session (Venice, 16-17 March 2012)|access-date=26 April 2020|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205083705/https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2012)001-e.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref> After the [[Court of Justice of the European Union]] ruled that this decision violated EU laws relating to equality in the employment context, the government repealed the law and compensated the judges, but did not reinstate those forced to retire.<ref name=":7" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=47BE6CE8F3FFB2A968FDC47239C86389?text=&docid=129324&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12775028|title=CURIA - Documents|website=curia.europa.eu|access-date=26 April 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317155820/https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=47BE6CE8F3FFB2A968FDC47239C86389?text=&docid=129324&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12775028|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.helsinki.hu/a-strasbourgi-pereskedes-is-kellett-ahhoz-hogy-visszavonjak-a-birak-kenyszernyugdijazasat/ |title=A strasbourgi pereskedés is kellett ahhoz, hogy visszavonják a bírák kényszernyugdíjazását |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=20 December 2018 |website=helsinki.hu |publisher=Magyar Helsinki Bizottság |access-date=3 May 2020 |archive-date=14 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714180108/https://www.helsinki.hu/a-strasbourgi-pereskedes-is-kellett-ahhoz-hogy-visszavonjak-a-birak-kenyszernyugdijazasat/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://jogaszvilag.hu/nem-volt-jogserto-a-birak-nyugdijazasa/ |title=Nem volt jogsértő a bírák nyugdíjazása |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=9 January 2019 |website=jogaszvilag.hu |publisher=Wolters Kluwer |access-date=3 May 2020 |archive-date=17 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317153236/https://jogaszvilag.hu/vilagjogasz/nem-volt-jogserto-a-birak-nyugdijazasa/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The 2012 judiciary reform also centralized administration of the courts under the newly-established National Judiciary Office, then headed by [[Tünde Handó]] (a lawyer married to [[József Szájer|a prominent member of Fidesz]]).<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":8" /> Under Handó, the NJO also weakened the institutions of judicial self-governance, provoking what the European Association of Judges, [[Amnesty International]], and the [[Hungarian Helsinki Committee]] describe as a "constitutional crisis" within the Hungarian judiciary.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.amnesty.hu/data/file/4586-a-constitutional-crisis-in-the-hungarian-judiciary-09072019.pdf?version=1415642342|title=A Constitutional Crisis in the Hungarian Judiciary|access-date=26 April 2020|archive-date=11 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200311125925/https://www.amnesty.hu/data/file/4586-a-constitutional-crisis-in-the-hungarian-judiciary-09072019.pdf?version=1415642342|url-status=dead}}</ref> Hungarian judges interviewed by Amnesty International also expressed concerns about attacks on the judiciary and individual judges by politicians and in the media.<ref name=":7" /> The Hungarian government has dismissed criticism of its record on democracy issues.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21792644 |title=Hungary's Orban defies foreign criticism over laws |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=14 March 2013 |work=BBC News |access-date=5 September 2019 |archive-date=11 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210111024608/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21792644 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://bbj.hu/politics/szijjarto-freedom-house-criticism-of-hungary-is-nonsense_114599 |title=Szijjártó: Freedom House criticism of Hungary is 'nonsense' |last=Keszthelyi |first=Christian |date=15 April 2016 |newspaper=Budapest Business Journal |access-date=5 September 2019 |archive-date=3 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200803100457/https://bbj.hu/politics/szijjarto-freedom-house-criticism-of-hungary-is-nonsense_114599 |url-status=live }}</ref>
-According to the 2020 report of the V-Dem Institute at the [[University of Gothenburg]], Hungary had by 2019 become the first-ever [[Member state of the European Union|EU member state]] to become an authoritarian regime.<ref name=VDem2020/> On Freedom House's annual report, Hungary's democracy rating dropped for ten consecutive years.<ref name="KrekóEnyedi"/> Its classification was downgraded from "democracy" to "transitional or [[hybrid regime]]" in 2020; Hungary was also the first EU member state to be labeled "partially free" (in 2019). The organization's 2020 report states that "Orbán's government in Hungary has similarly dropped any pretense of respecting democratic institutions".<ref>{{cite web |title=Dropping the Democratic Facade |url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade |website=Freedom House |access-date=23 October 2020 |language=en |archive-date=10 May 2020 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20200510152015/https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Hungary Becomes First 'Partly Free' EU Nation in Democracy Gauge |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-05/hungary-becomes-first-partly-free-eu-nation-in-democracy-gauge |access-date=23 October 2020 |work=Bloomberg.com |date=5 February 2019 |language=en |archive-date=25 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201125025107/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-05/hungary-becomes-first-partly-free-eu-nation-in-democracy-gauge |url-status=live }}</ref> A 2018 article published in the ''[[Journal of Democracy]]'' also described Hungary as a hybrid regime.<ref name="KrekóEnyedi">{{Cite journal|last1=Krekó|first1=Péter|last2=Enyedi|first2=Zsolt|date=2018|title=Orbán's Laboratory of Illiberalism|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/698916|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=29|issue=3|pages=39–51|doi=10.1353/jod.2018.0043|s2cid=158956718|issn=1086-3214|access-date=25 January 2021|archive-date=30 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201130211145/https://muse.jhu.edu/article/698916|url-status=live}}</ref> Recently Hungary also backslid in its view regarding [[LGBT rights in Hungary]], creating a bill similar to the [[Section 28]] bill.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Reuters|first=Story by|title=Hungary's parliament passes anti-LGBT law ahead of 2022 election|url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/15/europe/hungary-protests-lgbtq-law-intl/index.html|access-date=2021-06-25|website=CNN|date=15 June 2021|archive-date=2 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210702152849/http://www.cnn.com/2021/06/15/europe/hungary-protests-lgbtq-law-intl/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In July 2021, leaked data acquired by the [[Pegasus Project (investigation)|Pegasus Project]] suggested the Hungarian government may have used [[NSO Group]]'s [[Pegasus (spyware)|Pegasus]] spyware to target opposition journalists.<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/18/viktor-orban-using-nso-spyware-in-assault-on-media-data-suggests|title = Viktor Orbán accused of using Pegasus to spy on journalists and critics|website = [[TheGuardian.com]]|date = 18 July 2021|access-date = 25 December 2021|archive-date = 23 December 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211223053452/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/18/viktor-orban-using-nso-spyware-in-assault-on-media-data-suggests|url-status = live}}</ref> Hungarian officials acknowledged that they had purchased the spyware, but noted that they had received permission from either the courts or the Ministry of Justice in every case it was used.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hungarian-official-admits-its-government-bought-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware/|title=Hungarian official admits its government bought NSO Group's Pegasus spyware|website=[[The Times of Israel]]|access-date=25 December 2021|archive-date=9 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211109170335/https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hungarian-official-admits-its-government-bought-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware/|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====North Macedonia====
-Macedonian Prime Minister [[Nikola Gruevski]]'s [[VMRO-DPMNE]] government, which was in power from 2006 to 2016, has been described as engaging in democratic backsliding.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Bloomberg News]]|date=7 June 2017|title=Macedonia Vows to Resume EU Path Now That 'Strongman' Is Out|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-05/balkan-state-vows-to-resume-eu-path-now-that-strongman-is-out|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=14 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180214082707/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-05/balkan-state-vows-to-resume-eu-path-now-that-strongman-is-out|url-status=live}}</ref> Following Gruevski's departure from office as part of the [[Pržino Agreement]], he was prosecuted for the wiretapping of thousands of Macedonian officials, inciting his supporters to violence and election misconduct.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/macedonia-special-prosecutor-janeva-charge-94-illegal-wiretapping-scandal-abuse-of-power-gruevski-zaev/28587330.html|title=More Than 90 Indicted In Macedonia Over Wiretap Scandal|website=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=18 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201118123859/https://www.rferl.org/a/macedonia-special-prosecutor-janeva-charge-94-illegal-wiretapping-scandal-abuse-of-power-gruevski-zaev/28587330.html|url-status=live}}</ref> He subsequently fled the country and was granted political asylum in Hungary.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Financial Times]]|title=Macedonia's Gruevski says Hungary has granted asylum|date=20 November 2018|url=https://www.ft.com/content/87c6059e-ece1-11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=4 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210204201752/https://www.ft.com/content/87c6059e-ece1-11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Poland====
-{{see also|2015–present Polish constitutional crisis|Judiciary of Poland#Reforms of late 2010s and consequences}}
-In the Polish case, the [[European Commission]] stated in December 2017 that in the two preceding years, the Polish legislature had adopted "13 laws affecting the entire structure of the justice system in Poland" with the "common pattern [that] the executive and legislative branches [were] systematically enabled to politically interfere in the composition, powers, administration, and functioning of the judicial branch."<ref name="CE_20171220" /> In February 2020, [[Věra Jourová]], [[Vice President of the European Commission]] for Values and Transparency, described the disciplining of judges in Poland as "no longer a targeted intervention against individual black sheep, similar to other EU member states, but a case of carpet bombing. ... This is no reform, it's destruction."<ref name="ThomReut_PL_carpet_bombing" /> In late September 2020, 38 European and other law professors called on the [[President of the European Commission]] to take action in Poland, stating:
-<blockquote>Polish authorities continue to openly abuse, harass and intimidate judges and prosecutors who are seeking to defend the rule of law. In addition, Polish authorities continue to openly defy the authority of the [[European Court of Justice|Court of Justice]] by refusing to follow its judgments. ... judges who are attempting to apply EU law are being threatened and punished while those who flaunt violations of EU law are being rewarded. ... The rule of law in Poland is not merely being attacked. It is being destroyed in plain sight.<ref name="RuleOfLawPl_OpenLetter_Leyer" /></blockquote>
-====Romania====
-The [[Social Democratic Party (Romania)|Social Democratic Party]] (PSD) has been repeatedly accused of democratic backsliding while in power in Romania, initially during the tenure of Prime Minister [[Victor Ponta]], who led the country during the [[2012 Romanian constitutional crisis]], when Ponta engaged in several unconstitutional actions in an attempt to impeach President [[Traian Băsescu]].<ref>{{cite book|page=553|first=Christine|last=Hassenstab|year=2019|title=Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989}}</ref> Ponta's conduct was criticized by the [[European Union]] and the [[United States]].<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Wall Street Journal]]|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577516994036559110|title=Romanian Court Clears President's Impeachment|date=9 July 2012|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317153324/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577516994036559110|url-status=live}}</ref>
-Ponta was accused of restricting voting among the Romanian diaspora in the [[2014 Romanian presidential election]], during which Ponta was running as the PSD presidential candidate.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/thousands-of-romanians-locked-outside-london-embassy-denied-their-right-to-vote-9834568.html|title=Hundreds of Romanians locked outside London Embassy 'denied their right to vote'|work=The Evening Standard|date=3 November 2021|first=Anna|last=Dubuis|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=11 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111205423/http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/thousands-of-romanians-locked-outside-london-embassy-denied-their-right-to-vote-9834568.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Following the election, which Ponta lost, his close ally, Sebastian Ghiță, was indicted for offering illegal incentives to Moldovans with Romanian citizenship to vote for Ponta.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/europe/romania-from-frying-pan-to-legal-fire.html|title=Romania: From Frying Pan to Legal Fire|work=The New York Times|date=24 June 2015|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205043238/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/world/europe/romania-from-frying-pan-to-legal-fire.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Ghiță subsequently fled the country for Serbia, due to his good relationship with Serbian President [[Aleksandar Vučić]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.romania-insider.com/sources-runaway-romanian-investor-sebastian-ghita-seen-serbia/|title=Sources: Runaway Romanian investor Sebastian Ghita, seen in Serbia|work=Romania Insider|date=16 March 2017|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205052948/https://www.romania-insider.com/sources-runaway-romanian-investor-sebastian-ghita-seen-serbia/|url-status=live}}</ref> Ponta also left Romania for Serbia from 2016 to 2018, receiving Serbian citizenship and serving as an advisor to Vučic.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://eu-ocs.com/former-romanian-prime-minister-victor-ponta-acquitted-of-corruption/|title=Former Romanian prime minister Victor Ponta acquitted of corruption|work=EU-OCS|date=10 May 2018|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=9 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210209020154/https://eu-ocs.com/former-romanian-prime-minister-victor-ponta-acquitted-of-corruption/|url-status=live}}</ref>
-After facing a corruption investigation in 2015, Ponta initially refused to resign as Prime Minister, prompting the [[2015 Romanian political crisis]]. After the [[2015 Romanian protests]], Ponta ultimately resigned in November 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/europe/romania-victor-ponta-resigns.html|title=Victor Ponta, Romania's Premier, Steps Down After Outcry Over Corruption|work=The New York Times|date=4 November 2015|first1=Kit|last1=Gillet|first2=Palko|last2=Karasz|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=8 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201108113834/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/europe/romania-victor-ponta-resigns.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
-PSD leader [[Liviu Dragnea]], who was accused of vote rigging during the 2012 referendum, was ultimately convicted in 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-romania-corruption/romanian-ministerfound-guilty-of-vote-rigging-in-referendum-idUSKBN0O00J820150515|title=Romanian minister found guilty of vote-rigging in referendum|work=Reuters|first=Luiza|last=Ilie|date=15 May 2015|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205070507/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-romania-corruption/romanian-ministerfound-guilty-of-vote-rigging-in-referendum-idUSKBN0O00J820150515|url-status=live}}</ref> He was later indicted for abuse of office in 2016, preventing him from running for Prime Minister.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ft.com/content/a59499e0-8080-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b|title=Romania's Liviu Dragnea sentenced to jail for corruption|work=Financial Times|date=27 May 2019|access-date=28 May 2021|archive-date=25 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201125115731/https://www.ft.com/content/a59499e0-8080-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In 2017, PSD Prime Minister [[Sorin Grindeanu]]'s government passed new legislation decriminalising misconduct by officials, which was condemned by President [[Klaus Johannis]] as a "day of mourning for the rule of law" in Romania. The legislation led to the [[2017 Romanian protests]].<ref>{{cite news|work=[[The Guardian]]|title=Protesters in Romania denounce plan to decriminalise misconduct offences|date=1 February 2017|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/01/romanians-protests-emergency-law-prisoner-pardons-corruption|access-date=4 February 2021|archive-date=8 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210208232630/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/01/romanians-protests-emergency-law-prisoner-pardons-corruption|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In 2019, Romania indicted [[Laura Codruța Kövesi]], the former chief prosecutor of the [[National Anticorruption Directorate]], who was running for [[European Public Prosecutor's Office|European Chief Prosecutor]] at the time, leading EU authorities to condemn Romania for backsliding on the rule of law. Critics claimed that Romania's indictment of Kövesi was motivated by her indictment of numerous politicians, including Dragnea, on corruption charges.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/romanian-president-calls-referendum-on-government-s-justice-reforms/29848277.html|title=EU Commission, Parliament Criticize Romania For Backsliding On Rule Of Law|website=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=8 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201108001643/https://www.rferl.org/a/romanian-president-calls-referendum-on-government-s-justice-reforms/29848277.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Ponta, who had then become an opponent of Dragnea and the Romanian government after leaving the PSD, criticized the decision and described the PSD as increasingly "Fidesz-like", referring to the Hungarian ruling party.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Euractiv]]|date=3 April 2019|title=Victor Ponta: The ruling PSD in Romania is becoming like Fidesz|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2019/interview/victor-ponta-the-ruling-psd-in-romania-is-becoming-like-fidesz/|access-date=4 February 2021|archive-date=19 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119064408/https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2019/interview/victor-ponta-the-ruling-psd-in-romania-is-becoming-like-fidesz/|url-status=live}}</ref>
-The [[European Commission]] and [[European Court of Justice]] Advocate-General have criticized Romania's 2020 judicial reforms, suggesting that they undermined the rule of law in the country.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/23/romania-judicial-reforms-contrary-to-eu-law-says-european-court-legal-advice|title=Romania: Judicial reforms 'contrary to EU law' — ECJ legal advice|first=Alasdair|last=Sandford|date=23 September 2020|website=euronews|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=13 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210213102437/https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/23/romania-judicial-reforms-contrary-to-eu-law-says-european-court-legal-advice|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/dan-nica-defends-romanias-judicial-reform-process|title=Dan Nica defends Romania's judicial reform process|date=29 June 2020|website=The Parliament Magazine|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=5 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205073217/https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/dan-nica-defends-romanias-judicial-reform-process|url-status=live}}</ref> The PSD lost power after the [[2020 Romanian legislative election]], with the new government pledging to reverse the reforms to comply with the EU's [[Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.intellinews.com/romania-government-to-pursue-ambitious-timetable-for-justice-reforms-200994/|title=Romania government sets "ambitious timetable" for justice reforms &#124; bne IntelliNews|date=22 January 2021|website=www.intellinews.com|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=22 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210122123233/https://www.intellinews.com/romania-government-to-pursue-ambitious-timetable-for-justice-reforms-200994/|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Serbia and Montenegro====
-[[Freedom House]]'s annual ''Nations in Transit'' report in 2020 reported that, due to democratic backsliding, [[Serbia]] and [[Montenegro]] in the [[Balkans]] were no longer democracies (as they had been classified since 2003) but had instead become [[hybrid regime]]s (in the "gray zone" between "democracies and pure autocracies").<ref name=NoLongerDem>{{cite news|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/hungary-serbia-montenegro-longer-democracies-report-200506161223889.html|title=Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro 'no longer democracies': Report|publisher=Al Jazeera|date=6 May 2020|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=15 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200915120043/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/hungary-serbia-montenegro-longer-democracies-report-200506161223889.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The reported cited "years of increasing [[state capture]], abuse of power, and strongman tactics employed" by Serbian President [[Aleksandar Vučić]] and Montenegrin President [[Milo Đukanović]].<ref name=NoLongerDem/> Shortly after that report was published, the opposition won the [[2020 Montenegrin parliamentary election]] and [[Zdravko Krivokapić]] was appointed to the office of [[Prime Minister of Montenegro|Prime Minister]], marking the first time since independence that the opposition has controlled the country's government.{{citation needed|date=July 2021}}
-====Slovakia====
-The tenure of [[Vladimír Mečiar]] as Slovak Prime Minister and President in the 1990s has been described by political scientists Elisabeth Bakke and Nick Sitter as a period of democratic backsliding, due to Mečiar's control over state media and centralisation of executive power.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Democratic Backsliding in the European Union|year=2019|first1=Elisabeth|first2=Nick|last1=Bakke|last2=Sitter|encyclopedia=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics}}</ref>
-Widespread protests in 2018 following the [[murder of Ján Kuciak]] have been described by some scholars as "helping to stave off democratic backsliding" by causing the resignation of [[Robert Fico]], who served as Prime Minister from 2006 to 2010 and 2012 to 2018.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Milada|last=Vachudova|title=Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe|journal=East European Politics|year=2020|volume=36|issue=3}}</ref> However, Bakke and Sitter have disputed allegations of democratic backsliding against Fico, noting that Fico often emphasized "his commitment to pluralistic democracy", which contrasted with the Polish and Hungarian leadership during that time period and Slovakia under Mečiar.<ref name=bakke>{{cite journal|journal=Perspectives on Politics|title=The EU's Enfants Terribles : Democratic Backsliding in Central Europe since 2010|year=2020|first1=Elisabeth|last1=Bakke|first2=Nick|last2=Sitter|volume=20|pages=1–16|doi=10.1017/S1537592720001292|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/10CE615BAD56E79125E828D321641C0A/S1537592720001292a.pdf/the-eus-enfants-terribles-democratic-backsliding-in-central-europe-since-2010.pdf|doi-access=free|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161125/https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/10CE615BAD56E79125E828D321641C0A/S1537592720001292a.pdf/the-eus-enfants-terribles-democratic-backsliding-in-central-europe-since-2010.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Slovenia====
-Prime Minister [[Janez Janša]] has been criticised by Žiga Faktor of the [[EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy]] for overseeing democratic backsliding in Slovenia. Faktor claimed that Janša had aligned Slovenia closely with Hungary, denied journalists access to information during the [[COVID-19 pandemic]], and had expanded his [[Slovenian Democratic Party]]'s influence over the country's media with Hungarian financial support.<ref>{{cite web|work=[[EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy]]|first=Žiga|last=Faktor|title=Backsliding of democracy in Slovenia under right-wing populist Janez Janša|date=April 2020|url=https://europeum.org/data/articles/eumonzigaapril-2020.pdf|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=1 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210201065337/https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/eumonzigaapril-2020.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Ukraine====
-Several Ukrainian governments have faced accusations of democratic backsliding.
-Prior to the removal of President [[Viktor Yanukovych]] in the [[2014 Ukrainian revolution]], Ukraine was described by political scientist Eleanor Knott as experiencing democratic backsliding and "soft authoritarianism".<ref>{{cite journal|title=Perpetually "partly free": lessons from post-soviet hybrid regimes on backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe|journal=East European Politics|year=2018|volume=34|first=Eleanor|last=Knott|issue=3|pages=355–376|doi=10.1080/21599165.2018.1493993|s2cid=158640439|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88675/1/Knott_Perpetually%20Partly%20Free_Accepted.pdf|access-date=23 February 2021|archive-date=6 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200506051657/http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88675/1/Knott_Perpetually%20Partly%20Free_Accepted.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
-The [[Atlantic Council]]'s Maxim Eristavi claimed in 2017 that "Ukrainian democracy is in danger" following President [[Petro Poroshenko]]'s attempts to arrest his former ally and opposition figure [[Mikheil Saakashvili]], and calls by Poroshenko's party for criminal investigations into another political opponent, [[Yulia Tymoshenko]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Eristavi |first1=Maxim |title=Opinion {{!}} Forget Saakashvili's political career. Ukrainian democracy is in danger. |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/07/31/forget-saakashvilis-political-career-ukrainian-democracy-is-in-danger/ |newspaper=Washington Post |date=31 July 2017 |access-date=31 January 2021 |archive-date=5 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205203131/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/07/31/forget-saakashvilis-political-career-ukrainian-democracy-is-in-danger/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
-President [[Volodymyr Zelenskyy]] drew criticism for democratic backsliding from members of the [[U.S. House of Representatives]] following Zelenskyy's firing of a pro-reform cabinet and the resignation of former [[National Bank of Ukraine]] Governor [[Yakiv Smolii]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-congress-expresses-concern-over-democratic-backsliding-in-eastern-europe/30729585.html|title=U.S. House Hears Concerns Over Democratic Backsliding In Eastern Europe|website=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=15 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210315161524/https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-congress-expresses-concern-over-democratic-backsliding-in-eastern-europe/30729585.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Melinda Haring of the [[Atlantic Council]] has warned the [[Constitutional Court of Ukraine]]'s removal of authority from [[National Agency for Prevention of Corruption]] could put the country on the "on the edge of a major constitutional crisis" and criticized Zelenskyy's attempts to reform the Ukrainian judiciary as "ineffectual".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraine%E2%80%99s-big-backslide-continues-172147|title=Ukraine's Big Backslide Continues|first=Melinda|last=Haring|date=8 November 2020|website=The National Interest|access-date=31 January 2021|archive-date=4 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210104202846/https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraine%E2%80%99s-big-backslide-continues-172147|url-status=live}}</ref>
-=== India ===
-The [[V-Dem Institute]] (Varieties of Democracy) claims that democratic backsliding is taking place in India under Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] and the ruling [[Bharatiya Janata Party]], citing the passage of the [[Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019|2019 Citizenship (Amendment) Act]] and the government's subsequent response to the [[Citizenship Amendment Act protests]]. It also accused the Indian government of attempting to "stifle critics in the media and academia".<ref>{{cite web|work=[[V-Dem Institute]]|url=https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/democratic-backsliding-india-worlds-largest-democracy/|date=24 February 2020|title=Democratic Backsliding in India, the World's Largest Democracy|access-date=3 January 2021|archive-date=27 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227182459/https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/democratic-backsliding-india-worlds-largest-democracy/|url-status=dead}}</ref>
-Foreign policy commentator [[Jonah Blank]] has described the 2019 [[revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir]] as an example of the "slow transmogrification of democracy" under the Modi government.<ref>{{cite web|work=[[The Atlantic]]|title=India Just Put Democracy at Risk Across South Asia|date=8 August 2019|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/indias-kashmir-democracy/595711/|access-date=3 January 2021|archive-date=26 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126065153/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/indias-kashmir-democracy/595711/|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In 2020, the V-Dem Institute identified India as one of five severe cases of democratic backsliding, relating to disproportionate limitations being placed upon the role of the legislature through measures responding to COVID-19. This, they asserted, may lead to an 'increased danger of power abuse by the executive'.<ref name="COVID">{{cite web|author=Edge|first=Amanda B|date=30 June 2020|title=An Update on Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy Four Months After the Beginning of the Covid-19 Pandemic|url=https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b9/2e/b92e59da-2a06-4d2e-82a1-b0a8dece4af7/v-dem_policybrief-24_update-pandemic-backsliding_200702.pdf|work=Policy Brief #24|publisher=[[V-Dem Institute]]|access-date=25 January 2021|archive-date=17 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201217082732/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b9/2e/b92e59da-2a06-4d2e-82a1-b0a8dece4af7/v-dem_policybrief-24_update-pandemic-backsliding_200702.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
-Indian lawyer [[Gautam Bhatia (lawyer)|Gautam Bhatia]] asserts that the Indian government has taken advantage of 'vaguely worded' legislative clauses, some of a 'colonial vintage', to effectively bypass the 'deliberative organ' (the legislative) in relation to COVID-19. Some of these laws, he further asserted, technically hold 'formal statutory backing', making it more difficult for the legislature to oppose executive power.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://verfassungsblog.de/an-executive-emergency-indias-response-to-covid-19/|title=An Executive Emergency: India's Response to Covid-19|access-date=25 January 2021|archive-date=1 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210201230434/https://verfassungsblog.de/an-executive-emergency-indias-response-to-covid-19/|url-status=live}}</ref>
-The [[Economist Intelligence Unit]] downgraded India from 51st place to 53rd place in their 2020 [[Democracy Index]], citing "democratic backsliding" and "crackdowns" on civil liberties.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[CNBC TV18]]|date=3 February 2021|url=https://www.cnbctv18.com/politics/eiu-democracy-index-2020-indias-rank-slips-2-places-democratic-backsliding-blamed-for-fall-8195181.htm|title=EIU Democracy Index 2020: India's rank slips 2 places, 'democratic backsliding' blamed for fall|access-date=4 February 2021|archive-date=6 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210206153046/https://www.cnbctv18.com/politics/eiu-democracy-index-2020-indias-rank-slips-2-places-democratic-backsliding-blamed-for-fall-8195181.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In its 2021 ''Democracy under Siege'' report, [[Freedom House]] downgraded India from 'free' to 'partly free', citing the response to the Citizenship Amendment Act protests.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[BBC]]|title=India is now only 'partly free', says global report|date=3 March 2021|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-56249596|access-date=3 March 2021|archive-date=3 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303201849/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-56249596|url-status=live}}</ref>
-As of their ''Democracy Report 2021'', V-Dem lists India as an electoral autocracy, with significant downward movement to a number of indicators.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://scroll.in/latest/989199/india-has-turned-into-an-electoral-autocracy-claims-sweden-based-institute-report|author=Staff|title=India has turned into an electoral autocracy, claims Sweden based institute|website=The Scroll|date=11 March 2021|access-date=11 March 2021|archive-date=15 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210315205252/https://scroll.in/latest/989199/india-has-turned-into-an-electoral-autocracy-claims-sweden-based-institute-report|url-status=live}}</ref>  According to V-Dem, "In general, the Modi-led government in India has used laws on sedition, defamation, and counterterrorism to silence critics."<ref>Pillai, Shreeya and Lindberg, Staffan I. (2021) "Democracy Broken Down: India" in ''Democracy Report 2021: Autocratization Turns Viral'' pp.20-21. [[V-Dem Institute]]</ref>
-=== Israel ===
-{{see also|2019–2021 Israeli political crisis}}
-A number of scholars and commentators have identified [[Israel]] in the late 2010s under the premiership of [[Prime Minister of Israel|Prime Minister]] [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] as facing a crisis of [[liberal democracy]] and a risk of [[right-wing populism]]-fueled democratic decline, undermining its traditional status as a [[Jewish and democratic state|democratic state]].<ref name=Roznai>{{Cite encyclopedia|author=Yaniv Roznai|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|date=2018|title=Israel: A Crisis of Liberal Democracy?|work=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?|editor=Mark A. Graber|editor2=Sanford Levinson|editor3=Mark V. Tushnet|isbn=978-0-19-088898-5|publisher=Oxford University Press|oclc=1030444422|pages=355–376|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161150/https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=WittesMizrahi-Arnaud>{{Cite report|author=Tamara Cofman Wittes and Yael Mizrahi-Arnaud|title=Is Israel in democratic decline?|date=March 2019|url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190318_israel_decline_wittes_mizrahi-arnaud.pdf|publisher=Brookings Institution|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=19 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201219232431/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190318_israel_decline_wittes_mizrahi-arnaud.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=RottingInside>{{Cite web|author=Zack Beauchamp|title=Israeli democracy is rotting from the inside|date=10 April 2019|url=https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/10/18304567/israel-election-results-2019-democracy-palestinian|work=Vox|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=10 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201210232545/https://www.vox.com/world/2019/4/10/18304567/israel-election-results-2019-democracy-palestinian|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Zack Beauchamp|url=https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/2/27/21075868/israeli-democracy-war-netanyahu|title=The war on Israeli democracy|work=Vox|date=27 February 2020|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=1 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210101152002/https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/2/27/21075868/israeli-democracy-war-netanyahu|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Wolf>{{Cite web|author=Albert B. Wolf|url=https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/81920|publisher=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]]|date=27 May 2020|title=The Dangers of Israel's New Coalition|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=18 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210118064332/https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/81920|url-status=live}}</ref>
-Israeli legal scholar Aeyal Gross wrote that while Netanyahu's early premiership embraced a U.S.-style [[neoconservative]] approach, his later tenure "increasingly resembled the model of right wing populism with authoritarian tendencies" in the mode of Trump, Orbán, and Bolsanaro.<ref name=Gross>Aeyal Gross, [https://verfassungsblog.de/does-the-end-of-the-netanyahu-government-mark-the-end-of-democratic-backsliding-in-israel/ Does the End of the Netanyahu Government Mark the End of "Democratic Backsliding" in Israel?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210614125948/https://verfassungsblog.de/does-the-end-of-the-netanyahu-government-mark-the-end-of-democratic-backsliding-in-israel/ |date=14 June 2021 }}, ''[[Verfassungsblog]]'' (June 14, 2021).</ref> Yaniv Roznai of the [[Radzyner Law School]] at [[Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya]] wrote in 2018 that while Israel remained "a vibrant democracy with strong and effective judicial and democratic institutions", its liberal democracy was at risk "incremental erosion of Israel's democratic institutions through countless initiatives to prevent antigovernment criticism, to weaken the judiciary, to infringe minority rights, and to modify the democratic rules of the game."<ref name=Roznai/> Various scholars and commentators have cited as examples of democratic risks in Israel the "rise of [[ethno-nationalist]] populism"'<ref name=WittesMizrahi-Arnaud/> the passage of the [[Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People|Nation-State Law]];<ref name=RottingInside/><ref name=Wolf/><ref name=Gross/> the use of [[Nativism (politics)|nativist]] and exclusionary rhetoric by Netanyahu and his [[Cabinet of Israel|cabinet]] ministers;<ref name=Wolf/><ref name=WittesMizrahi-Arnaud/><ref name=Gross/> including comments during the [[2015 Israeli legislative election|2015 election]] campaign delegitimizing [[Arab Israeli]] voters<ref name=Roznai/><ref name=Wolf/> and comments labeling opponents and left-wing critics as traitors and tools of outside forces;<ref name=WittesMizrahi-Arnaud/> proposals to change Israeli law to modify the [[Status of territories occupied by Israel in 1967|status]] of (or [[Proposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank|unilaterally annex]]) the [[West Bank]];<ref name=Roznai/><ref name=RottingInside/> Netanyahu's effort to grant himself [[immunity from prosecution]] on [[Trial of Benjamin Netanyahu|charges of corruption]];<ref name=RottingInside/> legislative proposals to limit the powers and independence of the [[Israeli Supreme Court]], including the scope of its [[judicial review]] competence;<ref name=Roznai/> overtly racist or fear-mongering campaign advertisements by some parties of the populist right;<ref name=WittesMizrahi-Arnaud/> and efforts to exert greater control over the media<ref name=Roznai/><ref name=RottingInside/> and [[Non-governmental organizations|NGOs]].<ref name=RottingInside/> In a 2019 report, Tamara Cofman Wittes and Yael Mizrahi-Arnaud of the [[Brookings Institution]] argue that Israeli politics has "sources of resilience" that offer "pathways away from illiberal populism" including structural features of the Israeli political system (such as norms of liberal democracy and a fragmented [[parliamentary system]] that leads to competing populist parties) and cultural features of the Israeli society (such as a burgeoning women's movement that spans "secular-religious, Ashkenazi-Mizrachi, and Jewish-Arab divides").<ref name=WittesMizrahi-Arnaud/>
-In 2019 and 2020, four national elections were held. The first three resulted in a tie, essentially deadlocking between pro- and anti-Netanyahu forces. The [[2021 Israeli legislative election|March 2021 election]] resulted in Netanyahu's ouster and the formation of a broad-based coalition government consisting of right-wing anti-Netanyahu parties, centrist, center-left, left-wing, and Arab parties.<ref name=Gross/> Scholars discussed whether the change in power would mark the end of democratic backsliding that had occurred under Netanyahu.<ref name=Gross/><ref>Ayala Panievsky & Julius Maximilian Rogenhofer, [https://www.populismstudies.org/benjamin-netanyahu-likud-and-the-uncertain-fate-of-israels-democracy/ Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud and the uncertain fate of Israel's democracy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210525184150/https://www.populismstudies.org/benjamin-netanyahu-likud-and-the-uncertain-fate-of-israels-democracy/ |date=25 May 2021 }}, ''Populism Studies'' (February 2, 2021).</ref>
-===African nations===
-Various countries in Africa have experienced democratic backsliding. [[Christopher Fomunyoh]], a longtime Africa expert with the U.S.-based [[National Democratic Institute]], said in 2020 testimony to the [[United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Global Human Rights|U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Global Human Rights]] that there were strong democratic advances in Africa (especially [[West Africa]]) occurred between the late 1980s to the late 2010s, but that by 2019, democratic trends had reversed, with the result being "there are now fewer democracies in Africa" in 2021 than in 1991.<ref name=Fomunyoh>Christopher Fomunyoh, [https://www.ndi.org/publications/christopher-fomunyoh-facing-democratic-backsliding-africa-reversing-trend Facing Democratic Backsliding in Africa & Reversing the Trend] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210811120647/https://www.ndi.org/publications/christopher-fomunyoh-facing-democratic-backsliding-africa-reversing-trend |date=11 August 2021 }}, ''Democratic Backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa'', House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations (September 30, 2020).</ref> Fomunyoh noted that in the first 20 years of the 21st century, about a dozen countries in [[sub-Saharan Africa]] weakened or abolished constitutional [[term limit]]s for presidents; these moves weakened [[constitutionalism]] to benefit incumbents, removed one method of facilitating "the peaceful and orderly renewal of political leadership" and led to "excessive fragmentation and polarization of the [[polity]], and, in some cases outright violence, and the further shrinking of political space."<ref name=Fomunyoh/>
-[[Tanzania]] has experienced democratic backsliding since 2016, and [[Ethiopia]] since 2018.<ref name=Fomunyoh/> Other examples of democratic backsliding in Africa in the 2010s and 2020s include the [[2021 Malian coup d'état|coups in Mali in 2020]] and [[2020 Malian coup d'état|2021]]<ref name=Fomunyoh/> and [[Human rights in Zimbabwe|persecution of dissidents and civil society activists in Zimbabwe]].<ref name=Fomunyoh/>
-===Philippines===
-Under the rule of President [[Rodrigo Duterte]], the Philippines has been described as undergoing democratic backsliding.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Jürgen|last=Rüland|title=Democratic backsliding, regional governance and foreign policymaking in Southeast Asia: ASEAN, Indonesia and the Philippines|journal=Democratization|volume=28|year=2021|pages=237–257|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1803284|issn=1351-0347 |s2cid=225373459}}</ref>
-David Timberman of the [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] has argued that the Duterte government has "run roughshod over human rights, its political opponents, and the country’s democratic institutions", citing intimidation of political opponents, institutions and the media, increased [[extrajudicial killings]], and suggestions of implementing [[martial law]].<ref name="auto1">{{cite web|work=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]]|title=Philippine Politics Under Duterte: A Midterm Assessment|date=10 January 2019|url=https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091|first=David|last=Timberman|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=12 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210212141918/https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091|url-status=live}}</ref> Duterte has claimed to have looked to [[Vladimir Putin]] and [[Donald Trump]] as a role model to do more democratic backsliding.<ref name="auto1"/>
-During his term, Duterte threatened the shutdown of Philippine's largest TV network [[ABS-CBN]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Salaverria|first=Leila B.|date=2017-04-27|title=Duterte threatens to block franchise of ABS-CBN|url=https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/892527/duterte-threatens-to-block-franchise-of-abs-cbn|access-date=2021-07-10|website=INQUIRER.net|language=en|archive-date=18 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200618235159/https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/892527/duterte-threatens-to-block-franchise-of-abs-cbn|url-status=live}}</ref> In 5 May 2020 the network met its fate when the National Telecommunications Commission [[ABS-CBN franchise renewal controversy|issued a cease and desist order against to the network due to its expired franchise]]. Duterte also told the media that he would not sign the network's franchise even if the congress agrees to renew the franchise of the TV network.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Duterte won't recognize any new ABS-CBN franchise granted by Congress|url=https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-will-not-recognize-any-new-abs-cbn-franchise-granted-congress|access-date=2021-07-10|website=Rappler|date=8 February 2021|language=en|archive-date=12 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712035358/https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-will-not-recognize-any-new-abs-cbn-franchise-granted-congress|url-status=live}}</ref>
-[[File:Vladimir Putin (2018-03-01) 03 (cropped).jpg|thumb|238x238px|Under Putin's leadership, Russia has turned into an [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] state.]]
-===Russia===
-Under 20 years of [[Vladimir Putin]]'s leadership, Russia has experienced democratic backsliding. Putin became acting president in 1999, and then president in 2000, and he was able to use "public and elite dissatisfaction with the instability of the 1990s" to consolidate power in his hands, while overseeing a decade of economic growth.<ref name=Oliker>{{cite journal |last1=Oliker |first1=Olga |title=Putinism, populism and the defence of liberal democracy|journal=[[Survival (journal)|Survival]] |date=31 January 2017 |volume=59 |issue=1|pages=7–24 |doi=10.1080/00396338.2017.1282669 |s2cid=157503681 |doi-access=free }}</ref> The centralization of power under Putin weakened power of the [[Federal Assembly (Russia)|Federal Assembly]] and [[State Duma]] (Parliament), and led to a return to more autocratic rule seen during the Soviet era. In the late 1990s when [[Boris Yeltsin]] was president, [[Freedom House]] gave Russia a score of 4 for "freedom, civil liberties and political rights".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gerber |first1=Theodore |title=Public opinion on human rights in Putin-era Russia: Continuities, changes, and sources of variation|journal=Journal of Human Rights|date=28 July 2017 |volume=16 |issue=3|pages=314–331 |doi=10.1080/14754835.2016.1258550 |pmid=30100817 |pmc=6082807 }}</ref>
-Following subsequent de-democratization, experts do not generally consider Russia to be a democracy, citing purges and jailing of the regime's political opponents, curtailed press freedom, and the lack of free and fair elections. An example of the jailing of the regime's political opponents came most recently in 2021 when [[Alexei Navalny]] was arrested and sent to a penal colony and since then his [[Anti-Corruption Foundation]] has been deemed an extremist organization.<ref name= McFaul>{{cite news | title= Russia's Road to Autocracy | agency= [[Journal of Democracy]] | url= https://muse.jhu.edu/article/815934| access-date= 12 January 2022}}</ref> In 2021 more journalists and news outlets were declared foreign agents, with Russian TV channel [[Dozhd]] added to that list.<ref name=Roth>{{cite news | title= Putin's crackdown: how Russia's journalists became foreign agents | date= 11 September 2021 | agency= [[The Guardian]] | url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/11/putins-crackdown-how-russias-journalists-became-foreign-agents | access-date= 12 January 2022}}</ref> The [[Freedom House]] then in 2021 gave Russia a score of 20/100 and described it as not free. After serving 17 years as President, Putin, in 2021, signed a law allowing him to run in two more elections, potentially keeping him in power until 2036<ref name=Mehta>{{cite news | title= Russian President Vladimir Putin passes law that may keep him in power until 2036 | date= 6 April 2021 | agency= [[Sky News]] | url= https://news.sky.com/story/russian-president-vladimir-putin-passes-law-that-may-keep-him-in-power-until-2036-12267339 | access-date= 12 January 2022}}</ref> with the [[2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia]], leaving little constraint on his power.<ref name=Oliker/> Putin's 2012 "[[Russian foreign agent law|foreign agents law]]" targeted NGOs and furthered the crackdown on internal dissent.<ref name=Oliker/><ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":6" />
-Scholars differ in their perspectives on the significant post-1998 democratic backsliding in Russia under Putin.<ref name=Bova>{{Cite encyclopedia|author=Russell Bova|title=Russia and Europe after the Cold War: cultural convergence or civilizational clash?|work=Russia and Europe: Building Bridges, Digging Trenches|url=https://www.routledge.com/Russia-and-Europe-Building-Bridges-Digging-Trenches/Engelbrekt-Nygren/p/book/9780415625517|publisher=Routledge|editor=Bertil Nygren|date=2014|pages=34, 37|access-date=25 January 2021|archive-date=8 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200808010147/https://www.routledge.com/Russia-and-Europe-Building-Bridges-Digging-Trenches/Engelbrekt-Nygren/p/book/9780415625517|url-status=live}}</ref> Some view Russia's 1990s-era trend toward European-style democratization as fundamentally an ephemeral aberration, with Russia's subsequent democratic backsliding representing a return to its "natural" historical course.<ref name=Bova/> The opposite perspective is that the democratic decline under Putin would be a relatively short-term episode in Russian history: "From this perspective, Russia after 1991 was back on the path to Europe after the seventy-year interruption represented by [[Soviet Union|communism]]", and "that path was inevitably to be bumpy and subject to setbacks."<ref name=Bova/>
-=== Singapore ===
-According to a 2020 study,{{by whom|date=November 2021}} it claimed that Singapore experienced some democratic backsliding after the [[2015 Singaporean general election|2015 general election]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Abdullah|first=Walid Jumblatt|date=18 May 2020|title="New normal" no more: democratic backsliding in Singapore after 2015|journal=Democratization|volume=27|issue=7|pages=1123–1141|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1764940|s2cid=219452769|issn=1351-0347}}</ref>{{Update inline|reason=What's the situation now after the more recent [[2020 Singaporean general election|July 2020 elections]]?|date=November 2021}}
-=== Turkey ===
-Turkey under [[Recep Tayyip Erdoğan]] has experienced democratic backsliding.<ref name=Tansel/><ref name=AkyuzHess/><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-germany-cooperation.html|title=Turkey's Erdogan Changes His Tune, Seeking Support and Cooperation in Germany|last1=Bennhold|first1=Katrin|date=26 September 2018|work=The New York Times|access-date=27 May 2019|last2=Gall|first2=Carlotta|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=9 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109023707/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-germany-cooperation.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Yılmaz |first1=Zafer |last2=Turner |first2=Bryan S. |title=Turkey's deepening authoritarianism and the fall of electoral democracy |journal=British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies |date=2019 |volume=46 |issue=5 |pages=691–698 |doi=10.1080/13530194.2019.1642662|s2cid=199146838 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Scholar [[Ozan Varol]] writes that Erdoğan engaged in a form of "stealth authoritarianism" that incrementally increased pressure on democratic institutions over time and eventually culminated in authoritarianism.<ref name=Varol/> Although Erdoğan was originally viewed as a possible reformer, the Turkish government took a sharp authoritarian turn when it violently suppressed the [[Gezi Park protests]] in May 2013.<ref name="KirişciSloat">{{Cite report|author=Kemal Kirişci & Amanda Sloat|url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_turkey_kirisci_sloat.pdf|publisher=Brookings Institution|title=The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West|date=|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=8 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190808185854/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_turkey_kirisci_sloat.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> Increasing curbs on freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly coincided with Erdoğan's purge of liberal and conciliatory figures from the [[Justice and Development Party (Turkey)|Justice and Development Party]] (AKP).<ref name="KirişciSloat"/> A [[2007 Turkish constitutional referendum|constitutional referendum in October 2007]] changed the method of selection of the president from election by [[Grand National Assembly of Turkey|Parliament]] to direct election, marking a shift to a [[presidential system]].<ref name="KirişciSloat"/> Erdoğan consolidated executives power through his re-election in 2014 and his subsequent dismissal of [[Ahmet Davutoğlu]].<ref name="KirişciSloat"/> Following a [[2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt|failed coup attempt in 2016]] (which Erdoğan blamed on the [[Hizmet]] movement of his former ally-turned-rival, [[Fethullah Gülen]]), Erdoğan declared a [[state of emergency]]; undertook a [[2016–present purges in Turkey|series of major purges]] targeting [[civil society]] and perceived political opponents, including those within the bureaucracy, police, judiciary, and academia, and prosecutors; and dismantled the rule of law.<ref name="KirişciSloat"/> A [[2017 Turkish constitutional referendum|2017 constitutional referendum]] formally adopted a presidential system and further aggrandized executive power.<ref name="KirişciSloat"/><ref name=Varol/> The effect of the shifts, partly enabled by a weak and internally divided Turkish opposition,<ref name="KirişciSloat"/><ref name=Varol/> was to transform Turkey into a [[hybrid regime]].<ref name=AkyuzHess/> In its 2018 annual report, Freedom House classified Turkey as "not free" (the first time the country has been classified as such by Freedom House, which began publishing annual reports in 1999).<ref name="KirişciSloat"/> A 2019 report from the [[European Commission]] identified Turkey as "seriously backsliding" on areas of human rights, the rule of law and economic policy.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-democracy-backsliding-eu-says-in-membership-report/a-48965952|publisher=[[Deutsche Welle]]|date=29 May 2019|title=Turkish democracy 'backsliding,' EU says in membership report|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=28 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128131540/https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-democracy-backsliding-eu-says-in-membership-report/a-48965952|url-status=live}}</ref>
-A contrary view holds that Turkey was never a democracy to begin with.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Karaveli |first1=Halil |title=Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan |date=2018 |publisher=Pluto Press |doi=10.2307/j.ctv1nth9s |isbn=978-0-7453-3755-5 |jstor=j.ctv1nth9s|s2cid=158405214 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Cook |first1=Steven A. |title=Turkish Democracy Can't Die, Because It Never Lived |journal=Foreign Policy |date=13 May 2019 |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/13/turkish-democracy-cant-die-because-it-never-lived/ |access-date=28 May 2021 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128105342/https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/13/turkish-democracy-cant-die-because-it-never-lived/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
-===United Kingdom===
-[[Human Rights Watch]] has accused the government of [[Boris Johnson]] of democratic backsliding, citing the suspension of Parliament during the [[Brexit negotiations]] to prevent scrutiny, its appointments to important Parliamentary committees, and Parliament being cut out of the rule-making process during the [[COVID-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom|COVID-19 pandemic]], alongside the government attempting to water down the powers of independent courts and having "pilloried" the legal profession, pushing for "de facto immunity for torture and war crimes committed by British troops overseas", and attempting to restrict the access of certain media outlets to press briefings.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-10-26|title=Britain's Democratic Fabric is Being Eroded by Boris Johnson's Government|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/26/britains-democratic-fabric-being-eroded-boris-johnsons-government|access-date=2021-06-26|website=Human Rights Watch|language=en|archive-date=13 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210613044553/https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/26/britains-democratic-fabric-being-eroded-boris-johnsons-government|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[Constitution Unit]] of [[University College London]] also released articles warning of democratic backsliding after Johnson's government unveiled new bills in the [[2021 State Opening of Parliament]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Constitution Unit Monitor 78 / July 2021 |url=https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/constitution_unit/files/monitor_78.pdf |website=[[Constitution Unit]] |access-date=9 September 2021 |date=July 2021 |archive-date=9 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210909125500/https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/constitution_unit/files/monitor_78.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=Stephan Haggard |author2=Robert R Kaufman |author1-link=Stephan Haggard |title=The anatomy of democratic backsliding: could it happen here? |url=https://constitution-unit.com/2021/06/10/the-anatomy-of-democratic-backsliding-could-it-happen-here/ |website=[[Constitution Unit]] |access-date=9 September 2021 |date=10 June 2021 |archive-date=9 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210909125459/https://constitution-unit.com/2021/06/10/the-anatomy-of-democratic-backsliding-could-it-happen-here/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
-===United States===
-Political scientists have identified democratic backsliding in the United States in decades up to the 2020s.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2022 |title=Democratic Vulnerabilities and Pathways for Reform |url=https://doi.org/10.1177%2F00027162221077516 |journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|doi=10.1177/00027162221077516 |last1=Mettler |first1=Suzanne |last2=Lieberman |first2=Robert C. |last3=Michener |first3=Jamila |last4=Pepinsky |first4=Thomas B. |last5=Roberts |first5=Kenneth M. |volume=699 |pages=8–20 |s2cid=247499939 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VZKADwAAQBAJ&q=how+democracies+die |title=How Democracies Die |last2=Ziblatt |first2=Daniel |date=2018 |publisher=Crown |isbn=978-1-5247-6294-0 |language=en}}</ref>
-Political scientists have credited [[Newt Gingrich]] with playing a key role in undermining democratic norms in the United States and hastening [[Political polarization in the United States|political polarization]] and partisanship as the [[List of Speakers of the United States House of Representatives|50th]] [[Speaker of the United States House of Representatives]] from 1995 to 1999.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo27527354.html |title=Uncivil Agreement |last=Mason |first=Lililana |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=2018 |access-date=9 October 2020 |archive-date=18 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181018014705/https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo27527354.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo24660595.html|title=The Polarizers|last=Rosenfeld|first=Sam|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=2017|access-date=9 October 2020|archive-date=15 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181115061143/https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo24660595.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-gingrich-senators-9780199307456?cc=is&lang=en&#|title=The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress|last=Theriault|first=Sean M.|date=23 May 2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780199307456|location=Oxford, New York|access-date=9 October 2020|archive-date=22 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181122012735/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-gingrich-senators-9780199307456?cc=is&lang=en&|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Harris |first=Douglas B. |article=Let's Play Hardball |year=2013 |title=Politics to the Extreme |pages=93–115 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |doi=10.1057/9781137312761_5 |isbn=9781137361424}}</ref>
-The presidential candidacy and presidency of [[Donald Trump]] prompted grave concerns among political scientists regarding accelerated democratic backsliding in the United States.<ref>{{Cite journal|author=Robert Mickey|author2=[[Steven Levitsky]]|author3=Lucan Ahmad Way|volume=96|issue=1|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/america-still-safe-democracy|title=Is America Still Safe for Democracy: Why the United States Is in Danger of Backsliding Present at the Destruction|journal=[[Foreign Affairs]]|date=2017|access-date=13 September 2019|archive-date=10 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210310210732/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/america-still-safe-democracy|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |author=Robert R. Kaufman |author2=[[Stephan Haggard]]|volume=17|issue=2|title=Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from Middle-Income Backsliding?|pages=417–432|date=2019|journal=Perspectives on Politics|doi=10.1017/S1537592718003377|doi-access=free}}</ref> In a 2019 journal article, political scientists [[Robert C. Lieberman]], [[Suzanne Mettler]], and others wrote that Trump's presidency presented a threat to the American democratic order because it simultaneously brought together three specific trends&mdash;"[[Political polarization|polarized]] [[Two-party system|two-party]] presidentialism; a polity fundamentally divided over membership and status in the political community, in ways structured by race and economic inequality; and the erosion of democratic norms"&mdash;for the first time in American history.<ref name=Lieberman>{{Cite journal |author=Robert C. Lieberman |author2=Suzanne Mettler |author3=Thomas B. Pepinsky |author4=Kenneth M. Roberts |author5=Richard Valelly |title=The Trump Presidency and American Democracy: A Historical and Comparative Analysis|volume=17|issue=2|journal=Perspectives on Politics|date=June 2019|pages=470–79|doi=10.1017/S1537592718003286|doi-access=free}}</ref> Lieberman  noted that Trump has "repeatedly challenged the very legitimacy of the basic mechanics and norms of the American electoral process, invoking the specter of mass voter fraud, encouraging voter suppression, selectively attacking the [[United States Electoral College|Electoral College]], and even threatening to disrupt the [[United States presidential transition|peaceful transfer of power]]" and noted that "Never in the modern era has a presidential candidate threatened to lock up his opponent; castigated people so publicly and repeatedly on the basis of their country of origin, religion, sex, disability, or military service record; or operated with no evident regard for facts or truth."<ref name=Lieberman/> In 2020, political scientists [[Alexander Cooley]] and [[Daniel Nexon]], wrote that "the Trump administration has consistently de-emphasized the importance of human rights and democracy in its rhetoric and  while adopting language and tropes similar to those of right-wing, illiberal movements."<ref name=CooleyNexon>{{Cite book |author=Alexander Cooley |author2=Daniel Nexon|date=2020|title=Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order|work=Oxford University Press|pages=170–71}}</ref> Colley and Nexon cited Trump's praise of autocratic rulers, his echoing of ethno-nationalist rhetoric, his efforts to delegitimize journalism and journalists as "fake news" and his policies erecting new barriers to refugees and asylum-seekers as similar to politics "found in backsliding regimes".<ref name=CooleyNexon/>
-Political scientist [[Pippa Norris]] wrote in 2021 that democratic backsliding under Trump culminated in his attempts to undermine the peaceful transfer of power and [[Attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election|overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election]], in which Trump was defeated by [[Joe Biden]]; Trump incited an [[2021 storming of the United States Capitol|insurrection at the Capitol]] in January 2021, which briefly interrupted [[2021 United States Electoral College vote count|Congress's counting of the electoral votes]], which formalized Trump's loss and the victory of the incoming president.<ref>Pippa Norris, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-07/it-happened-america It Happened in America: Democratic Backsliding Shouldn't Have Come as a Surprise] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210301165915/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-07/it-happened-america |date=1 March 2021 }}, ''Foreign Affairs'' (7 January 2021).</ref>
-The 2019 annual democracy report of the V-Dem Institute at the [[University of Gothenburg]] found that the U.S. under Trump was among the world's liberal democracies experiencing "democratic erosion" (but not full-scale "democratic breakdown"). The report cited an increase in "polarization of society and disrespect in public deliberations" as well as Trump's attacks on the media and opposition and attempts to contain the judiciary and the legislature.<ref name=2019VDem/> The report concluded, however, that "American institutions appear to be withstanding these attempts to a significant degree", noting that Democrats had [[2018 United States House of Representatives elections|won a majority the House of Representatives]] in the [[2018 United States elections|2018 midterm elections]], which "seems to have reversed the trajectory of an increasingly unconstrained executive".<ref name=2019VDem/> The V-Dem Institute's 2020 report found that the U.S. had "registered a substantial decline in liberal democracy" under Trump; the report also found that "the United States of America is the only country in Western Europe and North America suffering from substantial autocratization."<ref name=VDem2020/>
-According to a 2020 study in the ''American Political Science Review'', Americans value democracy but are frequently willing to prioritize partisan political gains over democracy if the two are in conflict.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Graham|first1=Matthew H.|last2=Svolik|first2=Milan W.|date=2020|title=Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=114|issue=2|pages=392–409|doi=10.1017/S0003055420000052|s2cid=219053113|issn=0003-0554|doi-access=free}}</ref> Scholars have identified U.S. federalism,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Grumbach |first=Jacob |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UhdYEAAAQBAJ |title=Laboratories Against Democracy: How National Parties Transformed State Politics |date=2022 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-21845-8 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Grumbach |first1=Jacob |last2=Michener |first2=Jamila |title=American Federalism, Political Inequality, and Democratic Erosion |journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |date=2022 |volume=699 |pages=143–155 |url=https://doi.org/10.1177%2F00027162211070885 |doi=10.1177/00027162211070885 |s2cid=247499943 }}</ref> the urban-rural divide,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Mettler |first1=Suzanne |last2=Brown |first2=Trevor |date=2022 |title=The Growing Rural-Urban Political Divide and Democratic Vulnerability |url=https://doi.org/10.1177%2F00027162211070061 |journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=699 |pages=130–142 |doi=10.1177/00027162211070061 |s2cid=247499953 }}</ref> and the emergence of white identity politics<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Jardina |first1=Ashley |last2=Mickey |first2=Robert |date=2022 |title=White Racial Solidarity and Opposition to American Democracy |url=https://doi.org/10.1177%2F00027162211069730 |journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=699 |pages=79–89 |doi=10.1177/00027162211069730 |s2cid=247499954 }}</ref> as key drivers behind democratic backsliding in the U.S.
-In 2021 a Freedom House report rated the U.S. 83 out of 100, an 11-point drop from its rating of 94 out of 100 in 2011. Issues such as [[institutional racism]] in the United States in relation to criminal justice and voting rights, the negative influence of [[campaign finance]] which Freedom House views is damaging public trust in government, and increased [[political polarization in the United States]] due to the extreme use of partisan [[gerrymandering]] were cited as reasons for the decline in the United States' rating.<ref>{{cite news|last=Levine|first=Sam|date=2021-03-24|title=US sinks to new low in rankings of world's democracies|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/24/us-world-democracy-rankings-freedom-house-new-low|access-date=2021-03-24|issn=0261-3077|archive-date=24 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210324211652/https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/24/us-world-democracy-rankings-freedom-house-new-low|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In 2021 the [[International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance]] added the United States to their list of backsliding democracies, pointing to Trump's attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election, as well as state voting laws that disproportionately impact minority groups.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/22/in-first-us-added-to-annual-list-of-backsliding-democracies |title=In first, US added to annual list of 'backsliding' democracies |date=November 22, 2021 |work=Al Jazeera |access-date=22 November 2021 |archive-date=23 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211123005206/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/22/in-first-us-added-to-annual-list-of-backsliding-democracies |url-status=live }}</ref>
-===Latin America===
-====Bolivia====
-Former President [[Evo Morales]] was described by [[Oliver Stuenkel]] of the [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] as leading a "slow erosion of democracy" in Bolivia, claiming that Morales was "exerting tighter control over the judiciary and the opposition media".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/20/bolivia-s-democracy-at-risk-what-role-for-external-actors-pub-71301|title=Bolivia's Democracy at Risk: What Role for External Actors?|access-date=16 November 2021|archive-date=7 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210507201221/https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/20/bolivia-s-democracy-at-risk-what-role-for-external-actors-pub-71301|url-status=live}}</ref>
-The [[2019 Bolivian political crisis]], when the Bolivian military compelled President Morales to resign, was described by Javier Corrales as "one of the few examples of democratic backsliding in which the government ends defeated".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/opinion/bolivia-morales.html|title=Opinion &#124; from Bolivia, Sad Lessons on How to Fix Semi-Democracies|newspaper=The New York Times|date=15 November 2019|last1=Corrales|first1=Javier|access-date=16 November 2021|archive-date=19 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210819203645/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/opinion/bolivia-morales.html|url-status=live}}</ref> However, other analysts, such as Robert Carlson, have noted that acting President [[Jeanine Áñez]] "repeatedly delayed elections after a tumultuous transfer of power", describing this an example of pandemic-era democratic backsliding.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/coronavirus/will-democracy-latin-america-become-another-casualty-coronavirus-163673|title=Will Democracy in Latin America Become Another Casualty of the Coronavirus?|date=28 June 2020|access-date=16 November 2021|archive-date=24 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124094933/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/coronavirus/will-democracy-latin-america-become-another-casualty-coronavirus-163673|url-status=live}}</ref> Áñez and her ministers were later jailed on terrorism and sedition charges, which she described as a "political prosecution", with [[Human Rights Watch]] noting the arrest warrants "contain no evidence whatsoever that they have committed the crime of terrorism".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/13/bolivia-ex-president-anez-arrested-in-coup-probe-minister|title=Bolivia ex-president Jeanine Anez behind bars over alleged coup|access-date=16 November 2021|archive-date=8 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211108233539/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/13/bolivia-ex-president-anez-arrested-in-coup-probe-minister|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Brazil====
-Political scientist [[Robert Muggah]] argued in ''[[Foreign Policy]]'' that Brazil was undergoing backsliding under President [[Jair Bolsonaro]], noting Bolsonaro's criticisms of the judiciary and the electoral system, and his participation in anti-democratic rallies.<ref name="auto">{{cite web|work=[[Foreign Policy]]|title=Bolsonaro Is Following Trump's Anti-Democracy Playbook|date=14 January 2021|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/14/bolsonaro-brazil-trump-anti-democracy-elections/|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=4 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304135405/https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/14/bolsonaro-brazil-trump-anti-democracy-elections/|url-status=live}}</ref> Bolsonaro has often used [[Rodrigo Duterte]] and [[Donald Trump]] as a model to effect democratic backsliding in Brazil.<ref name="auto"/>
-In July 2021, Bolsonaro threatened to cancel the [[2022 Brazilian general election]], claiming election fraud would take place unless the electoral system was reformed.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Associated Press]]|url=https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-brazil-1c789f876515a64aa67f918f0d8d5fff|title=Brazil's Bolsonaro warns 2022 vote will be clean or canceled|access-date=30 August 2021|archive-date=12 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712033203/https://apnews.com/article/caribbean-brazil-1c789f876515a64aa67f918f0d8d5fff|url-status=live}}</ref>
-In August 2021, Bolsonaro described "three alternatives for [his] future", which he said were "being arrested, killed or victory" in the 2022 election.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[The Guardian]]|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/29/election-victory-death-or-prison-bolsonaros-names-his-three-alternatives-for-2022|title=Election victory, death or prison: Bolsonaro names his three alternatives for 2022|date=29 August 2021|access-date=30 August 2021|archive-date=30 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830051720/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/29/election-victory-death-or-prison-bolsonaros-names-his-three-alternatives-for-2022|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====El Salvador====
-El Salvador has been described as undergoing democratic backsliding after the election of President [[Nayib Bukele]], particularly following the [[2020 Salvadoran political crisis|2020 crisis]], when Bukele sent soldiers into the [[Salvadoran Legislative Assembly]] to pressure and intimidate members of the Assembly.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Reuters]]|title=El Salvador president's power play stokes democracy concerns|date=10 February 2020|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elsalvador-politics-idUSKBN2042M4|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=4 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304135436/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elsalvador-politics-idUSKBN2042M4|url-status=live}}</ref> In a June 2020 report, the [[V-Dem Institute]] wrote that El Salvador was "at high risk of pandemic backsliding" and that the country was one of several countries with "severe" violations of democratic standards of emergency measures, including: [[arbitrary detention|arbitrary mass arrests]] by security forces of persons deemed to violate social distancing rules (in contravention of a number of decisions of the [[Supreme Court of El Salvador|Supreme Court]]).<ref name="COVID"/>
-In 2021, supporters of Bukele in the Legislative Assembly [[2021 Salvadoran political crisis|dismissed El Salvador's judges of the Supreme Court]] and the Attorney General. The [[Organization of American States]] condemned the dismissals, declaring that they were undermining democratic principles.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|title=La OEA rechaza destitución de jueces de la Corte Suprema y del fiscal general en El Salvador {{!}} DW {{!}} 02.05.2021|url=https://www.dw.com/es/la-oea-rechaza-destituci%C3%B3n-de-jueces-de-la-corte-suprema-y-del-fiscal-general-en-el-salvador/a-57405562|access-date=2021-05-11|website=[[Deutsche Welle]]|language=es|archive-date=11 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210511123938/https://www.dw.com/es/la-oea-rechaza-destituci%C3%B3n-de-jueces-de-la-corte-suprema-y-del-fiscal-general-en-el-salvador/a-57405562|url-status=live}}</ref>
-The U.S. chargé d’ affaires ad interim to El Salvador, [[Jean Elizabeth Manes]], has said that the actions of the Bukele government have led to deteriorating relations with the United States, stating, "We simply can’t look away when there’s a decline in democracy".<ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/10/us-nicaragua-election-usa-analysis|title = Analysis-Ortega win is new blow to Biden's Central America strategy|date = 10 November 2021|access-date = 20 November 2021|archive-date = 20 November 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211120233043/https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/10/us-nicaragua-election-usa-analysis|url-status = live}}</ref>
-====Guatemala====
-Attempts by President [[Jimmy Morales]] to end the [[United Nations]] [[International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala]] have been described by Sanne Weber as having "raised serious doubts about democracy in the Central American country".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://theconversation.com/guatemala-expulsion-of-un-investigators-drags-country-down-authoritarian-path-102815|title=Guatemala: Expulsion of UN investigators drags country down authoritarian path|access-date=16 November 2021|archive-date=27 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201127204558/https://theconversation.com/guatemala-expulsion-of-un-investigators-drags-country-down-authoritarian-path-102815|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Honduras====
-The [[Organization of American States]] (OAS) was critical of the conduct of the [[2017 Honduran general election]], noting irregularities in its conduct and calling for fresh elections.<ref name="Malkin">Elisabeth Malkin, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/world/americas/honduran-presidential-election.html Honduran President Declared Winner, but O.A.S. Calls for New Election] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025010859/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/17/world/americas/honduran-presidential-election.html |date=25 October 2019 }}, ''New York Times'' (December 17, 2017).</ref> Following a decision by the [[Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Honduras)|Supreme Electoral Tribunal]], the election was won by President [[Juan Orlando Hernández]], who had run for a second term following the Honduran Supreme Court's decision to allow the President of the country to run for re-election. The tenure of Hernández and the [[National Party of Honduras]] has been described by Patricio Navia and Lucas Perelló as a period of democratic backsliding,<ref>{{cite news|work=American Quarterly|title=It's Not Just El Salvador. Democracies Are Weakening Across Central America.|url=https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-bigger-reason-to-worry-about-nayib-bukele-and-el-salvador/|date=March 1, 2021|access-date=19 November 2021|archive-date=17 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517185337/https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-bigger-reason-to-worry-about-nayib-bukele-and-el-salvador/|url-status=live}}</ref> with Perelló claiming that Hernández and the National Party had "dismantled democratic institutions" in Honduras.<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Foreign Policy (magazine)|Foreign Policy]]|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/24/honduras-election-asfura-castro-hernandez-national-party-libre/|title=Honduras's Pivotal Election|access-date=2 December 2021|archive-date=2 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211202041529/https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/24/honduras-election-asfura-castro-hernandez-national-party-libre/|url-status=live}}</ref> Hernández has also been accused of "human rights violations" and "extrajudicial killings".<ref>{{cite news|work=[[Los Angeles Times]]|title=Honduras at crossroads in election to end corrupt rule of Juan Orlando Hernandez|url=https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-11-27/honduras-at-crossroads-in-election-to-end-corrupt-rule-of-president-hernandez|date=November 27, 2021|access-date=2 December 2021|archive-date=2 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211202142227/https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-11-27/honduras-at-crossroads-in-election-to-end-corrupt-rule-of-president-hernandez|url-status=live}}</ref>
-Hernández also pursued close ties with Nicaraguan President [[Daniel Ortega]], despite ideological differences between the right-wing Hernández and left-wing Ortega, opposing or abstaining on resolutions condemning Nicaraguan actions at the OAS.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-10-28/ortega-y-juan-orlando-hernandez-una-extrana-alianza-preelectoral.html| title = Nicaragua: Ortega y Juan Orlando Hernández, una extraña alianza preelectoral {{!}} Internacional {{!}} EL PAÍS| date = 28 October 2021| access-date = 2 December 2021| archive-date = 27 November 2021| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211127113717/https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-10-28/ortega-y-juan-orlando-hernandez-una-extrana-alianza-preelectoral.html| url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = https://amicohoops.net/there-were-also-interventions-in-the-non-voting-oas-session-against-the-resolution-on-nicaragua/| title = There were also interventions in the non-voting OAS session against the resolution on Nicaragua| date = 21 October 2021| access-date = 2 December 2021| archive-date = 3 December 2021| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211203005313/https://amicohoops.net/there-were-also-interventions-in-the-non-voting-oas-session-against-the-resolution-on-nicaragua/| url-status = live}}</ref>
-Hernández subsequently followed constitutional term limits and chose not to run for a third term, and the National Party lost the [[2021 Honduran general election]].<ref>{{cite news|work=[[The Guardian]]|title=Honduras to get first female president after ruling party concedes defeat|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/01/honduras-to-get-first-female-president-after-ruling-party-concedes-defeat|date=1 December 2021|access-date=2 December 2021|archive-date=2 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211202181951/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/01/honduras-to-get-first-female-president-after-ruling-party-concedes-defeat|url-status=live}}</ref>
-====Nicaragua====
-Nicaragua under President [[Daniel Ortega]] has been described by Lucas Perelló and Patricio Navia as undergoing democratic backsliding, leading Ortega's [[Sandinista National Liberation Front]] to have a "dominant status" in the country's politics.<ref>{{Cite journal|journal=Politics|first1=Lucas|last1=Perelló|first2=Patricio|last2=Navia|title=Changes in support for Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front during democratic backsliding|date=November 25, 2020|doi=10.1177/0263395720961999|s2cid=229404295|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263395720961999|access-date=16 November 2021|archive-date=16 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116205504/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263395720961999|url-status=live}}</ref>
-Prior to the [[2021 Nicaraguan general election]], Nicaragua jailed opposition figures and journalists under a new treason law.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-11-06/after-jailing-rivals-nicaraguan-president-poised-for-reelection| title = Rivals jailed, Nicaraguan president poised for reelection - Los Angeles Times| website = [[Los Angeles Times]]| date = 6 November 2021| access-date = 16 November 2021| archive-date = 15 November 2021| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211115223621/https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-11-06/after-jailing-rivals-nicaraguan-president-poised-for-reelection| url-status = live}}</ref> Following the election, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Nicaragua.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2021/11/15/United-States-Canada-Britain-sanction-Nicaragua/7151637029630/| title = U.S., Canada, Britain sanction Nicaraguan officials over 'pantomime elections' - UPI.com| access-date = 16 November 2021| archive-date = 16 November 2021| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211116083617/https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2021/11/15/United-States-Canada-Britain-sanction-Nicaragua/7151637029630/| url-status = live}}</ref>
-====Venezuela====
-Since the late 1990s, Venezuela has undergone a significant backslide in democratic institutions.<ref name="Sabatini"/> [[Chavismo]] propelled democratic backsliding in Venezuela.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Kirk |last=Hawkins |ssrn=2779566 |title=Chavismo, Liberal Democracy, and Radical Democracy |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |volume=19 |year=2016 |pages=311–329 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-072314-113326 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
-From 1958 onward, [[Venezuela]] was considered to be a relatively stable [[democracy]] within a continent that was facing a wave of [[military dictatorship]], consuming almost all Latin American countries in the 1970s.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web|title=Venezuela was once the richest, most stable, democracy in Latin America. What happened?|url=https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-02-07/venezuela-was-once-richest-most-stable-democracy-latin-america-what-happened|last=Margolis, J. (2019).|website=The World from PRX|language=en|access-date=14 May 2020|archive-date=27 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210127030541/https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-02-07/venezuela-was-once-richest-most-stable-democracy-latin-america-what-happened|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":14">{{Cite book|last=Corrales|first=Javier|url=https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/venezuela-1980s-1990s-and-beyond|title=Venezuela in the 1980s, the 1990s and beyond|publisher=ReVista|year=1999|pages=26–29|language=en|access-date=15 May 2020|archive-date=12 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112022947/https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/venezuela-1980s-1990s-and-beyond|url-status=dead}}</ref> Until the early 1980s, it was one of Latin America's four most prosperous states; with an upper-middle economy, and a stable [[centre-left politics|centre-left]] democracy.<ref name=":14" /> The [[1980s oil glut|collapse of the oil market]] in the 1980s left Venezuela (a major crude oil exporter) in great debt.<ref name=":03" /><ref name=":14" />
-In the 1990s, during the second term of [[Carlos Andrés Pérez]] and the term of his successor [[Rafael Caldera]], the country implemented market-oriented strategies in order to receive monetary aid from the [[International Monetary Fund]], cuts spending on social programs, and eliminated price controls on consumer goods and gas,<ref name=":03" /> which caused social unrest and high inflation.<ref name=":14" /> [[Hugo Chávez]] won the [[1998 Venezuelan presidential election|presidency in December 1998]] by appealing on the desires of the poor and pledging economic reforms,<ref name=":03" /><ref name=":14" /> and, once in office, securing his power by creating an authoritarian regime, following a relatively stable pattern between 1999 and 2003.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal|last1=Corrales|first1=Javier|last2=Penfold-Becerra| first2=Michael.|date=2007|title=Venezuela: Crowding Out the Opposition|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=18|issue=2|pages=99–113|doi=10.1353/jod.2007.0020|s2cid=153648265|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> Chávez started rewriting the constitution swiftly after arriving in-office.<ref name=":32">{{Cite journal|last=Corrales|first=J.|date=2011|title=Latin-America: A Setback for Chávez|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=22|pages=37–51|via=Project MUSE}}</ref> After enabling himself to legally rewrite the constitution and therewith amending a presidential term from five to six years, with a single reelection, Chávez gained full control over the military branch. This allowed him to determine military promotions, and eliminate the [[Senate of Venezuela|Senate]]. As a result he no longer required legislative approval.<ref name=":32" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Corrales|first=Javier|date=2015|title=Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=26|issue=2|pages=37–51|doi=10.1353/jod.2015.0031|s2cid=153641967|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> The weakening of political institutions and increased [[Corruption in Venezuela|government corruption]] transformed Venezuela into a personal dictatorship.<ref name=":22" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last=de la Torre|first=Carlos|date=10 April 2017|title=Hugo Chávez and the diffusion of Bolivarianism|journal=Democratization|volume=24|issue=7|pages=1271–1288|doi=10.1080/13510347.2017.1307825|s2cid=218524439|issn=1351-0347}}</ref><ref name=":42">{{Cite journal|last1=Geddes|first1=Barbara|last2=Wright|first2=Joseph|last3=Frantz|first3=Erica|date=2014|title=Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set|journal=Perspectives on Politics|volume=12|issue=2|pages=313–331|doi=10.1017/s1537592714000851|s2cid=145784357|issn=1537-5927}}</ref>
-Chavez's dominance of the media (including a constant presence on television) and his charismatic personality contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela,<ref name=Landau>{{Cite encyclopedia|author=David Landau|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|title=Constitution-Making and Authoritarianism in Venezuela: The First Time as Tragedy, the Second as Farce|work=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?|date=23 August 2018|editor=Mark A. Graber|editor2=Sanford Levinson|editor3=Mark V. Tushnet|isbn=978-0-19-088898-5|publisher=Oxford University Press|oclc=1030444422|pages=164–167, 501|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161150/https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> in addition to constitutional revisions that concentrated Chávez's power and diminished the executive's accountability.<ref name=Scheppele>{{Cite encyclopedia|author=[[Kim Lane Scheppele]]|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|title=The Party's Over|work=Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?|date=23 August 2018|editor=Mark A. Graber|editor2=Sanford Levinson|editor3=Mark V. Tushnet|isbn=978-0-19-088898-5|publisher=Oxford University Press|oclc=1030444422|pages=164–167, 501|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=17 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210317161150/https://www.google.com/books/edition/Constitutional_Democracy_in_Crisis/e5WRDwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref>
-A rapid increase in crude oil prices around 2003 fueled economic growth in the country, allowing Chávez and his party to further entrench their dominance.<ref name=":32" /> By 2004, Chávez had gained full authority over the democracy-sustaining institutions, diminishing [[checks and balances]] and the power of the [[National Assembly of Venezuela|National Assembly]].<ref name=":32" /> Accusing traditional parties of causing the initial economic distress through exploitation of the country, he justified the weakening of non-executive branches by arguing that those branches were dominated by the traditional parties, and therefore unreliable.<ref name=":32" /> After Chávez' death in 2013, his successor [[Nicolás Maduro]] continued an authoritarian style of governance.<ref name=":42" /><ref name=":52">{{Cite web|title=Freedom in the World 2020: Venezuela|url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2020|date=2020|publisher=Freedom House|access-date=15 May 2020|archive-date=11 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210311192332/https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite web|title=EIU Democracy Index 2019 - World Democracy Report|url=https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index|website=www.eiu.com|access-date=15 May 2020|archive-date=24 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191024223940/http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index|url-status=live}}</ref> After the Venezuelan opposition won a majority of the [[National Assembly (Venezuela)|National Assembly]] in the [[2015 Venezuelan parliamentary election|2015 elections]], Maduro and his allies retained control of the other key levers of power, including the [[National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela|military]], [[PDVSA|state-run oil company]], [[Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Venezuela)|Supreme Court]], and [[National Electoral Council (Venezuela)|National Electoral Council]].<ref name=WOLA>{{Cite report|url=https://www.wola.org/analysis/human-rights-trends-2010s-venezuela-decline/|publisher=[[Washington Office on Latin America]]|title=Human Rights Trends of the 2010s: Venezuela's Decline|date=21 December 2019|access-date=29 May 2020|archive-date=24 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124123710/https://www.wola.org/analysis/human-rights-trends-2010s-venezuela-decline/|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2017, Maduro and his allies, moved to circumvent the opposition-controlled National Assembly by creating a [[2017 Constituent National Assembly|Constituent National Assembly]], dominated by government loyalists,<ref name=WOLA/> and declaring it the supreme organ of state power.<ref name=Landau/> This move further intensified Venezuela's democratic backsliding.<ref name=WOLA/> Currently, Venezuela is an [[authoritarian regime]],<ref name=":52" /><ref name=":62" /> and had even been described as a personal dictatorship.<ref name=":42" />
 ==Effects of judicial independence==
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 ==References==
 {{notelist}}
-{{Reflist|refs=
+{{Reflist}}
-<ref name="CE_20171220">{{cite web| last1 =European Commission| author-link =European Commission| title =Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland| date =20 December 2017| url =http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm| access-date =11 February 2018| archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20191121022400/https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367| archive-date = 21 November 2019| url-status =live}}</ref>
-<ref name="RuleOfLawPl_OpenLetter_Leyer">{{cite web | last1 = Pech | first1 =Laurent | display-authors=3 | last2= Scheppele |first2=Kim Lane | last3=Sadurski |first3=Wojciech |last4=Alemanno|first4=Alberto |last5=Balcerowicz|first5=Leszek | title= Before It's Too Late Open Letter to the President of the European Commission regarding the Rule of Law Breakdown in Poland | website= RuleOfLaw.pl |date =29 September 2020 | url = https://ruleoflaw.pl/letter-to-ursula-von-der-leyen-rule-of-law-poland/ | access-date = 16 October 2020 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201023030342/https://ruleoflaw.pl/letter-to-ursula-von-der-leyen-rule-of-law-poland/ |archive-date=23 October 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>
-<ref name="ThomReut_PL_carpet_bombing">{{cite news | title= Polish judiciary changes are a 'destruction': EU commissioner | date= 8 February 2020 |agency= [[Thomson Reuters]] | url= https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-eu-judges/polish-judiciary-changes-are-a-destruction-eu-commissioner-idUSKBN2020H3 |access-date=16 October 2020 |archive-url= https://archive.today/20201015233124/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-eu-judges/polish-judiciary-changes-are-a-destruction-eu-commissioner-idUSKBN2020H3 |archive-date= 15 October 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>
-}}
 ==Further reading==